Media manipulation by police to create a distinct communalied imagery by Sadanand Menon

Media manipulation by police to create a distinct communalied imagery by Sadanand Menon

http://communalism. blogspot. com/2008/ 09/media- manipulation- by-police- to-create. html

The Uses and Misuses of Photographs

Monday, September 22 was an extraordinary day in the annals the Indian media. I would like to call it a day of shame. For, on that day, our media collectively displayed its herd-like mentality and its entirely uncritical attitude to the use – and misuse – of the photographs it publishes.

At least eight mainstream English language newspapers (including The Times of India, The Indian and The New Indian Express, The Hindu, the Hindustan Times, The Deccan Chronicle) and many more in the language press from North to South and East to West, uncritically published almost identical photographs on their front pages. The photographs were not generated by any single agency. They were neither taken by 'citizen' photographers nor were they official handouts. They were shots by individual staff photographers as well as professional syndicated photographers. What is amazing is what newsrooms across the country chose to do with the image.

The photographs were of three suspects involved in the Delhi blasts, who were arrested from their residence in Delhi's Jamia Nagar. Reports also claimed they were students of the Jamia Milia Islamia. What was fishy about the photographs was that they showed three totally unidentifiable people, their head and face completely swathed in generous length of cloth, flanked by gun-toting policemen in mufti and other hangers-on. Yet it seemed obvious that this was a photo-op provided to the media – not to protect anyone's identity – but to precisely create a definite sense of identity.

For all the three suspects, to mask their identity, were tricked up by the local police in identical 'Palestinian Rumaals' or kaffiyehs or abayas or cassavas as this piece of head-dress is variously known. Though none of their faces were visible, to any casual reader of the newspapers it would be abundantly clear that they were of 'Arab', 'West Asian' or 'Islamic' origin. A clear case of racial profiling!

Some sceptical comments about this on the net, primarily generated by documentary film maker Yousuf Sayeed who lives in the same area, led to a small critical piece in The Hindustan Times two days later, raising critical questions. The sceptics wondered how it came about that the three arrested suspects came to be in possession of identical, brand new rumaals, which they could readily pull out of their pockets to cover their faces. As if, upon realising they might be arrested soon, they went shopping and bought identical scarves, so that everyone will recognise them as 'Islamic terrorists'. Critics pointed out that usually suspects arrested on various charges mask their faces with their own handkerchiefs or borrow towels or black cloth to hood their faces; never before had it seemed like such a costume drama as the Delhi police had managed to stage.

Then came the stunning revelation by the Delhi police commissioner. He confessed that it was his department which had dressed up the suspects in such a suggestive manner and, even more alarmingly, that the Delhi police had purchased these pieces of cloth "in bulk" for use by those arrested. Obviously, every arrested person could now be given a suggestive 'Islamic terrorist' look, thereby setting up dangerous subliminal propaganda within the media.

Repulsive as it is, most people will agree that the Police and its dirty-tricks department are not beyond using such obnoxious methods. What is beyond explanation is how the media collectively fell into this trap and carried these images without a single question mark or doubt about what they so readily display on their front pages.

For those not used to thinking about these things, the question can be framed a little differently. It has to do with conceptual issues related to the use (or misuse) of the image in the media. On any given day, hundreds of thousands of photographs are clicked. Of these, by common consensus, and governed by a largely abstract logic dealing with the received wisdom of 'news-value' or 'news-worthiness' , about five hundred to a thousand pictures might be considered for use within the media. After that, it is quite chancy or dependent on strong editorial choices why a photograph makes it to the papers, in particular the front page.

The front page photo, in the world of the print media, is usually associated with an iconic status. It is supposed be a quick encapsulation of what a paper or a region or a nation or a civilisation imagines as its primary concern. It frames the news of the day with a kind of visual evidence or back-up which then illustrates how it wants to set up the communication and how it wants the readers to enter the narrative.

Very seldom, across 365 days in a year, do we find identical images on the front page. That is supposed to be the greatness and the strength of democratic media practice that editorial position and interpretation of events can vary. It is also part of the notion of healthy competition in the media that variety, diversity and contrariness are seen as virtues – that a news item or image which is used sycophantically by one section of the press, can as easily be used critically by another section of the same press.

That is why, when you come across a substantial section of the national press use just one common image on their front page, and that too without an critical remarks or interrogative comments, one begins to smell the operation of 'ideology', which is nothing but a blind acceptance of certain 'ruling' ideas of a class or of a moment – ideas that indicate the power structures within which 'information' and 'meaning' are manufactured.

To me it is shattering, that on the evening of September 21, across the newsrooms of the best of Indian newspapers, not one editorial discussion chose to evaluate the photograph of the three arrested youngsters draped in checked cloth and use their judgement to 'read' the picture in a dispassionate manner worthy of a free press. Instead the Indian media collectively behaved as they had not even during the period of the Emergency and its draconian censorship. They all fell prey to their own sense of prejudice and communal mindset. The Nazi propaganda machine could not have expected to produce better results.

Obviously, Indian media needs to re-investigate the 'frame' within which it is presenting, colouring and analysing news. Such evidence of a collective cop-out is a serious failing, which it needs to critically examine and carry out correctives. In fact, this is a fit case for being taken before the Press Council.

Shame, a little shame is all that the media needs. For shame as Marx said, is a revolutionary sentiment.
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WHY BAN THE BAJRANG DAL?

PEOPLES UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS (PUDR)
Press Statement

WHY BAN THE BAJRANG DAL?
People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) finds the activities of the Hinduva group, in particular that of Bajrang Dal and Vishwa Hindu Parishad, repugnant and considers them a major threat to social peace and harmony. However we do not support the demand being made for proscribing these organizations as PUDR is in principle opposed to the politics of proscription. PUDR has long argued that politics of imposing a ban on an organization, which means preventing them from propagating their ideology and mobilizing people, is detrimental for India 's constitutional democracy. A ban imposed on political ideology, however abhorrent such ideology may appear, amounts to constricting legitimate political activity. In disallowing people an opportunity to publicly disagree or debate the views, it makes such views go underground and simmer and fester in our body politic. Banning an organization means curtailment of the fundamental freedom to hold political beliefs. Moreover bans stigmatize and isolate particular politics by criminalizing it, provide a handle to the state to silence dissent and persecuting people for their beliefs and convictions. We reiterate our demand for lifting the ban on all organizations, such as SIMI, ULFA, CPI (Maoists), NSCN etc. proscribed under the UAPA.

The context for the ban on VHP and BD is however a little different. Unlike most of the organizations banned under the UAPA which have been banned for political dissent and opposing the state, VHP and BD have extensive state patronage and are allowed to indulge in sectarian violence with impunity. So one of the major reasons for this demand being raised at all today is because both central and state governments have studiously downplayed heinous crimes committed by Hindutva organizations and have deliberately allowed them to get away without being brought to book for murder, rape, arson, and loot. By imposing a ban the government now wishes to make it appear as if they are atoning for their lack of will in providing justice to those who have suffered at the hands of Hindutva forces. However, whether the ban will at all be enforced is another matter altogether, given successive governments' lack of will in curbing the activities of organizations like the VHP and Bajrang Dal. Moreover with no action being taken against the fountainhead of these organizations, the RSS, the cadres of BD and VHP can quite simply disappear by being moved to a variety of organizations that have been promoted by RSS, thus proving the ban to be futile. If the state is sincere and keen to curb criminal activities of BD and VHP then it should start prosecuting all those guilty of the anti-Christian violence in Orissa Karnataka and Kerala.
We need more freedom to fight fascism and authoritarianism rather than curbs on our freedom of expression and association.

Harish Dhawan
Nagraj Adve
(Secretaries, PUDR)

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Peoples Union For Democratic Rights, Delhi (India)
(Peoples Union For Democratic Rights is a Delhi based organisation,
fighting for peoples rights in India for more than twenty five years now)

Sukhia Sab Sansar Khaye Aur Soye
Dukhia Das Kabir Jagey Aur Roye

An Open Letter to the Mediahouses in India! People's Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE)

An Open Letter to the Mediahouses in India!

The Struggle Committee
June 16, 2013
People's Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE)
Idinthakarai & P. O. 627 104
Tirunelveli District
Tamil Nadu

Dear friends:

Greetings! Please allow us to bring the following to your kind attention in the larger interests of our country, people and most importantly, our democracy and freedom. As the Fourth Pillar of our democracy, the media in India plays an important role in the smooth running of our country and the perpetuation of our democratic heritage.

We are sure that you have noticed the postponement of the commissioning of the Koodankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) to July 2013 without giving any reasons or explanations. It is really so disappointing and upsetting why no print or visual media in our country asks the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) or its Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) about this. There has not been one single editorial in any Indian newspaper or an informed debate on any TV debate on the repeated postponement of the KKNPP commission since 2005. Don't the people of India need to know the reasons behind this constant postponement and continued ducking and dodging by the prime minister, central ministers, chief minister, and nuclear officials?

We have been crying from the roof top that there has been massive corruption in the KKNPP and shoddy, substandard components and spares have been used in the project, but no mediahouse in India has shown any interest to probe this issue further. Most of the northern Indian mediahouses have not even shown any interest in the Koodankulam issue as if we were not part of India.

Although we cannot complain about the media coverage of our various struggles and campaigns here in Tamil Nadu both in the Tamil and the English media, a few irresponsible mediahouses have been portraying a very negative picture of our movement because of their connection with the nuclear industry, or their "higher caste" bias, or for cheap monetary gains. They go for sensationalism, profiteering, and unprincipled and unprofessional reporting. We would also like to point out that there have been good reports and analysis about the KKNPP issue but there is hardly any incisive inquiry into the commissions and omissions of the Indian nuclear industry in the larger media. Also many mediahouses in India tend to fall silent when power centers frown at them, or twist their arms.

As a result of the gross failure of the Fourth Pillar in our democracy, criminals wander about as leaders; 'Merchants of Venice' dominate the economic affairs; and all-knowing-scientists and engineers adopt an anti-people attitude in their mega-development projects. Consequently, there is rampant corruption, inefficiency, wastefulness, depression, inflation, regress, and overall moral decay all over the country.

Hence it is high time we undertook a thorough and comprehensive soul-search about the duties and responsibilities of the media in India. The Koodankulam struggle can be a cornerstone for undertaking this analysis.

We would earnestly request you to do a review of your own mediahouse's policies and practices and see if you feel and write for the "ordinary citizens" of India or for the vested interests of our country and the world. We enclose a write-up pointing out the salient features of the crippled KKNPP that deserves national attention and nation-wide debate. If the Indian mediahouses fail to do this, all the Neo-East India Companies from the United States, Russia, France and everywhere else will come to dominate our socioeconomic-political affairs and
enslave us all over again.

Looking forward to your careful consideration of our letter and favorable actions, we send you our best personal regards and all peaceful wishes,

Cordially,

S. P. Udayakumar M. Pushparayan F. Jayakumar
M. P. Jesuraj
Coordinator

R. S. Muhilan Peter Milton V. Rajalingam
Ms. S. Lidwin

Please allow us to bring the following dangerous developments, difficulties and discrepancies in the Koodankulam nuclear power project (KKNPP) to your kind consideration and request your immediate intervention to expose the irregularities and improprieties in the nuclear energy sector in India and save the people from massive disasters:

[1] Shoddy and Substandard Equipment from ZiO-Podolsk, Informtech Etc.
First and the most important of all, the KKNPP has been constructed with substandard equipment and parts supplied by ZiO-Podolsk, an engineering subsidiary of the Russian company Rosatom. The company's official website has declared unequivocally: "Over the past few years ZiO produced and implemented a set of equipment for foreign nuclear power plants with VVER-1000: Tianwan (China), Busher (Iran), Kudankulam (India)" (http://aozio.ru/production/ob-atom/). ZiO-Podolsk began shipping shoddy equipment in 2007 or perhaps even earlier. In February 2012, the procurement director, Mr. Sergei Shutov, was arrested for buying low quality and cheap raw material, passing it off as more expensive grade and pocketing the difference. The Federal Security Service, or FSB, the successor organization to the KGB, has been investigating the case that has serious implications for the safety of nuclear power plants built by Russia.

During July 15-18, 2012, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) delegation that included Special Secretary Mr. A. P. Joshi, Deputy Secretary Mr. Ninian Kumar and the Manager of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Mr. Dzhogesh Pady visited ZiO-Podolsk and discussed a range of issues related to the preparation for the launch of KKNPP-1, the progress of the KKNPP-2 etc. and signed a number of contracts relating to the implementation of the current phase of the KKNPP. (AtomEnergoMash, Posted 19.07.2012).

However, when we asked the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) under RTI on January 28, 2013 for "a list of those equipment and parts that have been supplied by Zio-Podolsk to the KKNPP units," the NPCIL replied tersely on February 20, 2013 (No. NPCIL/VSB/CPIO/2460/HQ/2013/371): "No Information regarding any investigation against Zio-Podolsk is available to NPCIL." It is a gross untruth and deception because the top DAE officials had just visited the ZiO-Podolsk and they must have followed up the developments. The NPCIL is hiding serious and important information from the Indian public and misleading the entire nation possibly to protect some Russian and Indian middlemen and profiteers.

When we asked the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) on January 28, 2013 for "a list of those equipment and parts that have been supplied by Zio-Podolsk to the KKNPP units" they responded on February 12, 2013 (No. AERB/RSD/RTI/Appl. No. 329/2013/2421) very evasively: "Selection of a company for supplying any equipment to NPCIL, is not under the purview of AERB. However, with respect to Quality Assurance (QA) during design, construction, commissioning and operation, a set of well established AERB documents on QA Codes and Guides are published and they were followed during the safety review of KKNPP."

Later the NPCIL confirmed officially (in its letter No. NPCIL/VSB/CPIO/2574/KKNPP/2013/737 dated April 29, 2013) that the controversial and corruption-ridden M/S ZiO Podolsk has supplied the following equipment and parts to the KKNPP: "Steam Generators, Cation and anion filters, Mechanical Filter, Moisture Separator and Reheater, Boric solution storage tanks, Regenerative blow down heat exchanger, Pipelines and fittings of different systems, Insulation materials, PHRS Heat exchanger." In other words, the Koodankulam project in its entirety is unsafe and dangerous.

Another Russian court has convicted one Mr. Alexander Murach, Director of another notorious Russian company, Informtech, for fraud and sentenced him to three years in prison for selling counterfeit measuring equipment for nuclear and hydro power plants' turbines. The NPCIL has just confirmed in its letter dated May 24, 2013 (No. NPCIL/VSB/CPIO/2670/HQ/2013/884) that they have received "Communication equipment" from Informtech.

Some ten Czech and Slovak companies have also supplied valves, pumps and cables to the Koodankulam project. Leoš Tomíček, Executive Vice-president of Rusatom Overseas says: "We already work with Czechs today. For example, for two blocks of the Indian Koodankulam nuclear power plant, nine Czech companies supplied us with valves, pumps, cables and other equipment worth 58 million dollars." There have been many cable-related accidents and deaths at the KKNPP. T. S. Subramanian says in a 2009 article: "Cabling is under way in the state-of-the-art control room for Unit-1, which is akin to an aircraft's cockpit. M.I. Joy, Additional Chief Engineer (Site Planning), KKNPP, said, "Once the cabling is completed, the entire control of the plant, including the reactor and turbine, will be done from the control room." The plant's control room is humidity-controlled. "The atmosphere is so pure here that the cables will not be spoiled," said Joy. (http://www.frontline.in/navigation/? type=static&page=flonnet&rdurl=fl2616/stories/20090814261612). It is this "so pure" atmosphere that has killed six workers in the past three months in electrocution accidents. The quality of the Czech cables and the checkered electrical work, and the role of Mr. M. I. Joy in all these are important questions must be looked into.

Since shoddy and substandard equipment and parts in a massive nuclear power park pose enormous dangers of epic proportion to millions and millions of innocent people in Tamil Nadu, Kerala and elsewhere, this issue has to be thoroughly and comprehensively probed in collaboration with the officials of Rosatom, Atomstroyexport, Federal Security Service (FSB) and most importantly, with independent nuclear experts in India.

[2] The Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Lies!
Izhorskiye Zavody, which is part of United Machinery Plants (OMZ) holding, signed a contract with India for the construction of two nuclear reactor bodies for Kudankulam's station in 2002. They shipped a new nuclear reactor body that would be the first power unit of India's Kudankulam nuclear power plant to the city's sea port. Yevgeny Sergeyev, general director of Izhorskiye Zavody, said at a ceremony sending off the reactor: "We were so sure of our partners that we started to produce the first reactor bodies four months before the official contract was signed." Sergeyev said the reactor was completed six months before deadline (The St Petersburg Times, 19 November 2004, http://sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=2135).

The Koodankulam reactor pressure vessel (RPV) arrived at the Tuticorin Port in January 2004. The first unit of the power plant was expected to be synchronized in December 2007, and the second unit by December 2008. Mr. S. K. Aggarwal, the then project director said: "The project officials have targeted to complete the works for synchronisation of both the units in March and September 2007 respectively."

The Russian Federal Service for Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Supervision, Rostekhnadzor, claimed in 2009: "The main causes of violations in the NPP construction works are insufficient qualifications, and the personnel's meagre (sic) knowledge of federal norms and rules, design documentation, and of the technological processes of equipment manufacturing. In particular, the top management of Izhorskiye Zavody have been advised of the low quality of the enterprise's products and have been warned that sanctions might be enforced, up to suspending the enterprise's equipment production licence" (http://www.gosnadzor.ru/osnovnaya_deyatelnost_slujby/otcheti-o-deyatelnosti-sluzhbi-godovie/). Unlike the original design of the Koodankulam RPVs, the erected ones have beltline welds, questionable quality and corruption charges.

[3] Fiddling with the Reactor Design and Doing an Unauthorized Refit
When the People's Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE)'s dialogue with the Central Government's Expert Group got aborted due to the violent attack on us by some anti-social elements, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister appointed a team of four members to study the KKNPP issue. When that group included Dr. M. R. Srinivasan, the former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), we objected to his inclusion in the team. However, he continued to be part of the team and we did have a dialogue with the team on February 19, 2012 in Tirunelveli.

During our interaction that was held in the presence of the Tirunelveli District Collector and other officials, Dr. Srinivasan never mentioned once that the DAE had made changes in the core of the reactor. It is also not revealed to the public until now if he and the team included this unauthorized fiddling in the report they submitted to the CM. However, Dr. Srinivasan has publicly acknowledged now: "We sought an additional safety mechanism well before the Fukushima disaster. The safety mechanism consists of valves. The original reactor design had to be altered and I feel this is the basic cause for delay." According to him, the valves were designed partially in India and Russia and compatibility with the reactor led to some hiccups (http://newindianexpress.com/states/tamil_nadu/article1517314.ece).

After fiddling with the original design of the KKNPP reactors, the Indian authorities went back and did an unauthorized "refit" without revealing the details to anyone. All these things point out the inherent deficiencies of the Russian reactors, their vulnerability due to all the fiddling, and their untrustworthiness after the refit. Since this matter has to do with the lives and sustenance of millions and millions of people, all the relevant details must be made public.

[4] Blaming the Protests for Atomic Inefficiency and Inept Engineering
The Russian and the Indian nuclear authorities are hiding their corruption, wastefulness and inefficiency by conveniently blaming the struggling people for all the delay and cost overrun. The Indian Express newspaper asserts that the "delay is on the supply side from Russia as a whole lot of components have been replaced, some of which had to be shipped in." The KKNPP sources have also confessed that the "containment vessel of the nuclear core too has been changed since the old one had sprung a leak, which was detected three months ago during testing" (http://newindianexpress.com/states/tamil_nadu/article1517314.ece).

The KKNPP authorities claim that "most components meant for Unit-II that were already in the warehouse were used as replacements for Unit-I." It is not clear why they were kept in the warehouse since Unit 2 was also being concurrently constructed along with Unit 1. The nuclear authorities are hiding the plain truth that Unit 1 is a complete failure and hence they are trying to revive it with the parts of Unit 2. Nobody knows the total loss that India has suffered because of all these shifting and shuffling.

The Srinivasan-confessed "refit" of KKNPP-1 is being blamed on its "idling for months together because of a major agitation plus litigation in the Supreme Court." This is an outrageous falsehood! Even when our agitation was going on between September 2011 and March 2012, regular and full-swing maintenance work was going on at the Koodankulam plant on a daily basis. When the Tamil Nadu government changed its stand on our agitation on March 19, 2012 and pushed us to the village of Idinthakarai, the Site Director of KKNPP Reactors I and II, Mr. R.S. Sundar, said the "water chemistry" of the water being used in the coolant was encouraging as proper maintenance had been carried out with skeletal staff during the protests (P. Sudhakar, "Croatian experts to inspect the condition of equipment," The Hindu,March 23, 2012).

Mr. S. T. Arasu, Senior Maintenance Engineer at KKNPP said: "We have operated all the pumps to measure the vibration level, which is less than the desirable baseline data and it shows the quality of our skilled workforce. Though this section could not be given complete attention during the past five-and-a-half months, the equipment are functioning in an amazing fashion" (P. Sudhakar, "Employees at Kudankulam project site a charged lot," The Hindu, March 24, 2012).

Mr. Yevgeniy N. Dudkin, the head of the Russian Specialists Group, said that none of the Russian specialists of Atomstroyexport had left the project site during the protests. He pointed out that some additional works needed to be done and said, "It is not a huge work." (P. Sudhakar and S. Sundar, "Primary coolant pumps to undergo another trial," The Hindu, March 29, 2012.)

Similarly, when the Supreme Court began its hearing on a batch of petitions in September 2012, they refused to give a 'stay' to halt the ongoing work at KKNPP and allowed the authorities to continue with their work. Accordingly, the AERB allowed fuel loading in September 2012 dismissing the feelings and sentiments of millions of struggling people in Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Now the Supreme Court has given a green signal to run the project subject to 15 stringent recommendations.

But the KKNPP, NPCIL, AERB, and the DAE officials are conveniently blaming their inordinate delay in commissioning the KKNPP-1 on the "corrosion and leakage since sea water was used as the coolant." If the pipes leak and corrode within such a short time, the government should order a probe into the quality of these pipes, the quality of the various equipment and spares that were sent by the Russians. If these pipes and parts cannot withstand one year of sea water circulation, how are they going to function safely for 40-60 years?

[5] Mounting Costs and Massive Corruption
Every single deal that India has signed with Russia has proved to be a disaster and big loss for India. The INS Vikramaditya/Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier has been delayed by five years with the final cost hovering in the $2.9 billion range. The time overrun and cost escalation also plagues another mega Indo-Russian defense deal of upgrading MiG-29 fighter planes. The KKNPP is yet another disaster.

The approved cost of the KKNPP 1 & 2 project is Rs. 13,171 crores. But the DAE and the NPCIL claim that they have spent an additional amount of Rs. 4,000 crores on the non-performing project. Nobody knows the exact end cost of the KKNPP or the breakdown of the final amount. The former AERB Chief, Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan, has claimed that the decision to import 40,000 MW capacity Light Water Reactors (LWRs) in early 2006 was taken without any techno-economic evaluation by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) or any other agency. According to Dr. Gopalakrishnan, "The decisions, price negotiations and supply terms are being negotiated by the UPA- 2 government in haste, with the intention of fulfilling the PM's commitments to these foreign governments and their companies before he demits office. .The decision was merely a quid-pro-quo to give business to the reactor manufacturers in those countries which helped India get a Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) waiver" (DNA, February 16, 2013).

The Russian nuclear company, Atomstroyexport, has just released its financial statement for the year 2011. The company claims that losses in 2011 were twice bigger than the losses of 2010, and that the company is on the brink of bankruptcy. This has seriously affected the Russian nuclear projects at Koodankulam in India and Busher in Iran . We wonder if the Indian government is secretly helping the Russian company with its losses and bankruptcy.

The NPCIL authorities have claimed that the Rs.4,000 crores cost overrun at Koodankulam is due to the "increase in interest during construction (IDC), escalation on works, contractor's overheads and establishment charges" (RTI reply dated February 20, 2013). It is pertinent to note that the Russian government is not making such financial compensation to India for all the delay and cost overrun in all of the above projects.

Instead of explaining these mounting costs and massive irregularities, the Russian Ambassador to India Mr. Alexander Kadakin simply misleads Indians by unnecessary and unacceptable comments on our internal affairs. We wonder if the Indian nuclear establishment is secretly helping the Russian company with its losses and bankruptcy. We wonder if the Koodankulam financial irregularities involve both Indian and Russian nuclearocrats, diplomats and politicians.

[6] Commissioning the KKNPP Every 15 Days
Instead of reporting to the citizens of India inside India about the largest and imported nuclear power park at Koodankulam, the Prime Minister of India goes to South Africa and reassures the President of Russia of its commissioning process (no pun intended). When the Prime Minister had announced in Moscow that the KKNPP would be commissioned "in a couple of weeks" on December 15, 2011, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister expressed her dissent and displeasure immediately.

The calendar for commissioning of KKNPP-1 has been shifted some 20 times in the past one year by politicians, bureaucrats and the nuclear authorities. In fact, this "commission dating" process has been going on from 2005 onwards and the Union Minister of State, Mr. V. Narayanasamy has set a record of sorts for himself in this calculated and irresponsible misinformation campaign. All these people have been lying to the nation repeatedly and recklessly and hence we cannot trust these authorities with our and our families' safety and well-being. If there is any truth and decorum in public life in India, all these officials should resign from their respective posts.

[7] No Information, No Liability, No Pollution Safeguard
The Government of India and the DAE have not shared any basic information with us about the KKNPP. Even after the Central Information Commission (CIC) has instructed them, they have not shared the Site Evaluation Report (SER) and the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) with us. They have not heard our opinions or allayed our fears and concerns about the lack of fresh water resources, the changes in the design of the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV), the management of liquid and solid waste and so on.

Neither have the Indian nuclear authorities got any liability from the Russian government and/or companies for KKNPP 1 and 2. The Government of India is not even willing to share the secretive Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) that they signed with the Russian government in 2008. Even as we are dealing with KKNPP 1 and 2, the Government of India is announcing the agreement on KKNPP 3 and 4 with utter disregard for the sentiments of the local people and the people of Tamil Nadu as a whole.

The Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (TNPCB) has also given consent to discharge enormous amounts of sewage, trade effluent, desalination plant effluent, demineralization effluent, steam generator effluent, suspended solids, dissolved solids, and many other waste products into the sea. The TNPCB fixed the temperature of the effluents at the discharge point as 45 degrees and later summarily reduced it to 36 or 37 degrees. They have also allowed the KKNPP to release significant amounts of Sulphur Dioxide, Nitrogen Dioxide, particulate matters and many other harmful radioactive pollutants into the air. Nobody seems to bother about the impact of all these on the sea, sea food, crops, dairy, food security, nutrition, health and wellbeing of us, our children and grandchildren.

Furthermore, it is revealed now that the NPCIL does not hold valid and legitimate clearances for all the various buildings and installations in the KKNPP from the Tamil Nadu Coastal Zone Management Authority under the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification of 2011.

[8] The Tamils Get Elegy and the Others Get Energy!
Even though the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister has written to the Prime Minister on March 31, April 25 and August 19, 2012, demanding all the power from the KKNPP to Tamil Nadu, the Prime Minister or his PMO never even acknowledged those letters. Earlier the CM had demanded more power from the Central Pool and financial help for various power generation schemes, but the UPA government always ignored her genuine requests and earnest efforts.

If this is the way the UPA government treats the Chief Minister of an important State and popular leader of millions of Tamil people, one can possibly imagine the feelings and attitude they may have towards the poorest of the poor who have been struggling on our own for almost two years now. The Congress Party and the UPA government seem to have scant regards for the Tamil fishermen, Tamil women, and the Tamil people as a whole.

It is also strange that our neighboring states would not share the Nature-given river waters with us but we, the Tamil people, have to suffer nuclear waste, thermal pollution, saline refuse, and most importantly, nuclear radiation and give them all risk-free electricity. It is quite preposterous that the Congress government in Kerala stakes a claim for 500 MW from the KKNPP; in fact, the Congress governments in Delhi and Thiruvananthapuram can together decide to set up a few nuclear power plants somewhere in Kerala. The intelligent and Nature-loving people of Kerala would never allow that and the political parties there, whether Congress or Communists or BJP or others, would never let that happen also.

Given the above situation, may we request you to demand an inquiry into the construction, equipment, overall quality, performance and the viability of the entire Koodankulam nuclear power project; removal of the fuel rods from the core of the Unit 1 reactor; conversion of the KKNPP into a pro-people and Nature-friendly Model New Energy Park; bringing about renewable energy projects all over our country; rectifying the transmission and distribution issues, and protecting the interests and well-being of the Tamil people and our progeny please.

If we let this shoddy, substandard, unsafe, and corruption-ridden nuclear power project to go critical and fail in our collective historic duty to protect our people, preserve our Natural resources and prop up the interests of newborn and unborn generations of India, we all will be held responsible and answerable for all the upcoming calamities and uncalculable harms to our people.

Iraq: Blame the victim for your defeat

Published on Monday, November 27, 2006 by the Guardian / UK
They Lied Their Way into Iraq. Now They Are Trying to Lie Their Way out.
Bush and Blair will blame anyone but themselves for the consequences of their disastrous war - even its victims

by Gary Younge

'In the endgame," said one of the world's best-ever chess players, José Raúl Capablanca, "don't think in terms of moves but in terms of plans." The situation in Iraq is now unravelling into the bloodiest endgame imaginable. Both popular and official support for the war in those countries that ordered the invasion is already at a low and will only get lower. Whatever mandate the occupiers may have once had from their own electorates - in Britain it was none, in the US it was precarious - has now eroded. They can no longer conduct this war as they have been doing.

Simultaneously, the Iraqis are no longer able to live under occupation as they have been doing. According to a UN report released last week, 3,709 Iraqi civilians died in October - the highest number since the invasion began. And the cycle of religious and ethnic violence has escalated over the past week.

The living flee. Every day up to 2,000 Iraqis go to Syria and another 1,000 to Jordan, according to the UN's high commissioner for refugees. Since the bombing of Samarra's Shia shrine in February more than 1,000 Iraqis a day have been internally displaced, a recent report by the UN-affiliated International Organisation for Migration found last month.

Those in the west who fear that withdrawal will lead to civil war are too late - it is already here. Those who fear that pulling out will make matters worse have to ask themselves: how much worse can it get? Since yesterday American troops have been in Iraq longer than they were in the second world war. When the people you have "liberated" by force are no longer keen on the "freedom" you have in store for them, it is time to go.

Any individual moves announced from now on - summits, reports, benchmarks, speeches - will be ignored unless they help to provide the basis for the plan towards withdrawal. Occupation got us here; it cannot get us out. Neither Tony Blair nor George Bush is in control of events any longer. Both domestically and internationally, events are controlling them. So long as they remain in office they can determine the moves; but they have neither the power nor the credibility to shape what happens next.

So the crucial issue is no longer whether the troops leave in defeat and leave the country in disarray - they will - but the timing of their departure and the political rationale that underpins it.

For those who lied their way into this war are now trying to lie their way out of it. Franco-German diplomatic obstruction, Arab indifference, media bias, UN weakness, Syrian and Iranian meddling, women in niqabs and old men with placards - all have been or surely will be blamed for the coalition's defeat. As one American columnist pointed out last week, we wait for Bush and Blair to conduct an interview with Fox News entitled If We Did It, in which they spell out how they would have bungled this war if, indeed, they had done so.

So, just as Britain allegedly invaded for the good of the Iraqis, the timing of their departure will be conducted with them in mind. The fact that - according to the foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett - it will coincide with Blair leaving office in spring is entirely fortuitous.

More insidious is the manner in which the Democrats, who are about to take over the US Congress, have framed their arguments for withdrawal. Last Saturday the newly elected House majority leader, Steny Hoyer, suggested that the Americans would pull out because the Iraqis were too disorganised and self-obsessed. "In the days ahead, the Iraqis must make the tough decisions and accept responsibility for their future," he said. "And the Iraqis must know: our commitment, while great, is not unending."

It is absurd to suggest that the Iraqis - who have been invaded, whose country is currently occupied, who have had their police and army disbanded and their entire civil service fired - could possibly be in a position to take responsibility for their future and are simply not doing so.

For a start, it implies that the occupation is a potential solution when it is in fact the problem. This seems to be one of the few things on which Sunni and Shia leaders agree. "The roots of our problems lie in the mistakes the Americans committed right from the beginning of their occupation," Sheik Ali Merza, a Shia cleric in Najaf and a leader of the Islamic Dawa party, told the Los Angeles Times last week.

"Since the beginning, the US occupation drove Iraq from bad to worse," said Harith al-Dhari, the nation's most prominent Sunni cleric, after he fled to Egypt this month facing charges of supporting terrorism.

Also, it leaves intact the bogus premise that the invasion was an attempt at liberation that has failed because some squabbling ingrates, incapable of working in their own interests, could not grasp the basic tenets of western democracy. In short, it makes the victims responsible for the crime.

Withdrawal, when it happens, will be welcome. But its nature and the rationale given for it are not simply issues of political point-scoring. They will lay the groundwork for what comes next for two main reasons.

First, because, while withdrawal is a prerequisite for any lasting improvement in Iraq, it will not by itself solve the nation's considerable problems.

Iraq has suffered decades of colonial rule, 30 years of dictatorship and three years of military occupation. Most recently, it has been trashed by a foreign invader. The troops must go. But the west has to leave enough resources behind to pay for what it broke. For that to happen, the anti-war movement in the west must shift the focus of our arguments to the terms of withdrawal while explaining why this invasion failed and our responsibilities to the Iraqi people that arise as a result of that failure.

If we don't, we risk seeing Bono striding across airport tarmac 10 years hence with political leaders who demand good governance and democratic norms in the Gulf, as though Iraq got here by its own reckless psychosis. Eviscerated of history, context and responsibility, it will stand somewhere between basket case and charity case: like Africa, it will be misunderstood as a sign not of our culpability but of our superiority.

Second, because unless we understand what happened in Iraq we are doomed to continue repeating these mistakes elsewhere. Ten days ago, during a visit to Hanoi, Bush was asked whether Vietnam offered any lessons. He said: "We tend to want there to be instant success in the world, and the task in Iraq is going to take a while ... We'll succeed unless we quit."

In other words, the problem with Vietnam was not that the US invaded a sovereign country, bombed it to shreds, committed innumerable atrocities, murdered more than 500,000 Vietnamese - more than half of whom were civilians - and lost about 58,000 American servicemen. The problem with Vietnam was that they lost. And the reason they lost was not because they could neither sustain domestic support nor muster sufficient local support for their invasion, nor that their military was ill equipped for guerrilla warfare. They lost because it takes a while to complete such a tricky job, and the American public got bored.

"You learn more from a game you lose than a game you win," argued the chess great Capablanca. True, but only if you heed the lessons and then act on them.

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2006

Bush, Blair, Brown and Baloney: ‘Cruel, Callous, Inhumane and Unacceptable.’

Published on Saturday, March 31, 2007 by CommonDreams.org
‘Cruel, Callous, Inhumane and Unacceptable.’
by Felicity Arbuthnot
An Open Letter to the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, M.P.

Dear Mr Brown,

Standing in Afghanistan, you called the Iranian holding of fifteen British sailors who it is likely strayed in to Iranian waters: ‘Cruel, callous, inhumane and unacceptable.’ Breathtaking.Compared to the behavior of the UK and US troops, their treatment in Iran is seemingly a health spa.

‘Cruel, callous, inhumane and unacceptable’, is the total destruction of the country you were standing in. The boiling to death of several thousand prisoners, held in metal trucks in the sweltering summer, under the watch and very possibly at the hands of our American allies (complex accounts differ.) It is the bombing of village after village, of wedding parties and funerals, of goatherders, farmers, shepherds. It is reducing the country to a radioactive nightmare, where families bombed out of their homes have been found living in contaminated bomb craters - and suffering all the signs of radiation poisoning, according to the Uranium Metal Research Project, bleeding from all orifices with other accompanying appalling symptoms.

‘Cruel, callous, inhumane and unacceptable’, is the prison at Afghanistan’s Bagram airbase, where people are ‘rendered’, disappeared, shackled, forced to wear diapers, their eyes covered, and flown to Guantanamo Bay ‘the gulag of our time’, as cited by Amnesty International. Uncharged and untried, with rare access to lawyers, they are left to rot, between bouts of torturing.

‘Cruel, callous, inhumane and unacceptable’, is Abu Ghraib and the dozens of other prisons across Iraq, which sprung up under ‘liberation’, where the disappeared also languish, between the odd bit of waterboarding (being held under till near the the point of drowning) being stripped naked, having dogs attack, having unspeakable items shoved into bodily orifices (’We need electricity in our homes, not up our asses’, said one eventually released prisoner.)

‘Cruel, callous, inhumane and unacceptable’, is British troops in Basra pulling kids off the street and beating them up. It is hoisting some mother’s son in netting on a forklift. It is beating a young hotel worker to death, over two days. Though as usual, the British Courts, find just one person guilty. Other deaths have led to no one being found guilty. Presumably Iraqis have taken to beating themselves to death.

‘Cruel, callous, inhuman and unacceptable’, is allied soldiers raping, pillaging, demolishing homes, driving over kids in the road, in case they are ‘terrorist’ kids and toddlers. It is the gang rape of a child called Aber who was then killed and set alight with the rest of her family. It is the reported hanging of bodies round tanks in Fallujah and the sickos who collect Iraqi brain matter as a ‘trophy’. It is sending pictures of pathetic mutilated, dead, burned Iraqis, to porn sites in exchange for free access to shameful images of another kind.

‘Cruel, callous, inhumane and unacceptable’, is the abandonment of British residents in Guantanamo Bay and in Iraq, the recently aired fact that torture included chaining prisoners to bedsteads, bolted to walls (the US Army sure employs some impressive psychopaths.) It is the six hundred and fifty five thousand to nine hundred thousand excess Iraqi deaths at the hands of and under the watch of the ‘liberators’ (and that was last year’s figure.) It is the four million known to have fled all that is familiar to them, or who are internally displaced. It is Iraqis and their Palestinian guests, not knowing from day to day whether they will be expelled from their host country.

‘Cruel, callous, inhumane and unacceptable’, is the destruction of an entire civil society, the lynching of its legitimate leaders, the destruction of Baghdad, the ‘Paris of the ninth century’, of humanity’s history. It is the statement, last June, of Colleen Graffy, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, devoid of anything remotely connected to humanity, who said of three prisoners in Guantanamo who committed suicide, rather than live tortured and shackled, without hope, that their deaths were: ‘ a good PR move.’

‘Cruel, callous, inhumane and unacceptable’, were thirteen years of sanctions which cost maybe one and a half million lives, driven by the US and UK. Followed by an illegal invasion, a war of aggression and thus Nuremberg’s ’supreme crime’, for which there is a growing demand for those responsible to be tried. The sailors too and their colleagues could also be tried.

‘Cruel, callous inhumane and unacceptable’, on a personal note, is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office diplomats in Baghdad refusing to speak to the possible kidnappers of Margaret Hassan, who called her husband three times on her mobile ‘phone. It is the refusal of Ken Bigley’s brother’s plea to search for Ken via satellite, since he had one leg almost rebuilt with titanium - which can be picked up by satellites, which are pretty abundant in Iraq’s skies.

Lastly, it is worth looking at the website of your former Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray (www.craigmurray.co.uk) also former Maritime Head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. ‘The Iran-Iraq maritime boundary shown on the British government map does not exist. It has been drawn up by the British government…. (it is) a fake map.’ Good Lord, surely not another ‘dodgy dossier’?

Oh and ‘cruel, callous, inhumane and unacceptable behavior’, is, if British arrogance and intransigence ends up with their sailors being banged up for a long time. Iran offered the release of Faye Turney and British government intemperate language has seemingly scuppered that. A diplomatic disgrace of enormity. Yet again, a government ‘not fit for purpose’ - any purpose.

Felicity Arbuthnot is a London-based writer.

Deja Vu: The consequences of Vietnamising Iraq

Published on Monday, December 18, 2006 by CommonDreams.org
Iraq is Vietnam-and You'd Better Believe It
by John Graham

I was a civilian advisor/trainer in Vietnam, arriving just as US troops were going home. I wasn't there to fight, but I hadn't been in country a week when I learned that the word "noncombatant" didn't mean much where I was posted, fifty miles south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that then divided South Vietnam from North. I got the message when a sniper's bullet whistled past my ear on the main highway twenty miles south of Hué. Joe Jackson, the burly major who was driving, yelled at me to hold on and duck as he gunned the jeep out of range, zigzagging to spoil the sniper's aim.

Snipers or not, in 1971 it was the U.S. Government's policy not to issue weapons to civilian advisors in Vietnam, even to those of us in distant and dangerous outposts. The reason was not principle, but PR-and here begin the lessons for Iraq.

Sometime in 1969, the White House, faced with unrelenting facts on the ground and under siege from the public, had quietly made the decision that America couldn't win its war in Vietnam.

Nixon and Kissinger didn't put it that way, of course. America was a superpower, and it was inconceivable that it could lose a war to a third rate nation whose soldiers lived on rice and hid in holes in the ground. So the White House conceived an elaborate strategy that would mask the fact of an American defeat. The US would slowly withdraw its combat troops over a period of several years, while the mission of those who remained would change from fighting the North Vietnamese and Vietcong to training the South Vietnamese to carry on the fight on their own. At the same time, we would give the South Vietnamese a series of performance ultimatums which, if unmet, would trigger a total withdrawal and let us blame the South Vietnamese for the debacle that would follow. This strategy was called "Vietnamization." Implementing it cost at least 10,000 additional American and countless more Vietnamese lives, plus billions of dollars.

It was a rigged game from the start. All but the wildest zealots in Washington knew that the South Vietnamese would not and could not meet our ultimatums: an end to corrupt, revolving-door governments, an officer corps based on merit not cronyism, and the creation of a national state that enjoyed popular allegiance strong and broad enough to control the political and cultural rivalries that had ripped the country's fabric for a thousand years.

During the eighteen months I was in Vietnam, I met almost no Americans in the field who regarded Vietnamization as a serious military strategy with any chance of success. More years of American training could not possibly make a difference in the outcome of the war because what was lacking in the South Vietnamese Army was not just combat skills but belief in a cause worth fighting for.

But none of that was the point. Vietnamization was not a military strategy. It was a public relations campaign.

The White House hoped that Vietnamization would keep the house of cards upright for at least a couple of years, providing what CIA veteran Frank Snepp famously called a "decent interval" that could mask the American defeat by declaring that the fate of South Vietnam now was the responsibility of the South Vietnamese. If they didn't want freedom badly enough to win, well, we had done our best.

To make this deceitful drama work, however, the pullout had to be gradual. The plan (Vietnamization) had to be easily explained to the American people. And the US training force left behind had to be large enough and exposed enough to provide visual signs of our commitment on the 6:00 news. Pictures of unarmed American advisors like me shaking hands with happy peasants would support the lie that Vietnamization was succeeding.

Living in the bulls-eye, we understood the reality very well, especially when, as public pressures for total withdrawal increased in 1971-72, most of the "force protection" troops went home too. That left scattered handfuls of American trainers left to protect themselves. As the very visible US advisor to the city of Hué, I was an easy target for assassination or abduction, anytime the Viet Cong chose to take me out. I kept a case of grenades under my bed, I slept with an M-16 propped against the bedstead, and I had my own dubious army of four Vietnamese house guards whom I hoped would at least fire a warning shot before they ran away.

In April 1972. North Vietnamese forces swept south across the DMZ, scattering the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) defenders and driving to within six miles of Hué. I and a handful of other American trainers and advisors could only watch as a quarter-million panicked people gridlocked the road south to Danang, in a terrifying night reverberating with screams and explosions. We knew that any choppers sent to save us would be mobbed by Vietnamese eager to escape. I'm alive because American carrier jets caught the advancing North Vietnamese just short of the city walls and all but obliterated them.

Now we have the Iraq Study Group Report, advising that the mission of US forces shift from fighting a war to training Iraqi troops and police. The Report calls for the US to lay down a series of performance conditions for the Iraqis, including that the Iraqis end their civil war and create a viable national state.

I've lived through this one before.

Deteriorating conditions on the ground soon will force President Bush to accept this shift in mission strategy. It is Vietnamization in all but name. Its core purpose is not to win an unwinnable war, but to provide political cover for a retreat, and to lay the grounds for blaming the loss on the Iraqis. Based on what I saw in Vietnam, here's what I think will happen next:

The increased training will make no difference. It could even make things worse since we will be making better fighters of many people who will end up in partisan militias. What the Iraqi military and police need is not just technical skill but unit cohesion and loyalty to a viable central government. Neither can be taught or provided by outside trainers.

When US troops pull back from fighting the insurgents, most Iraqi units will lack both the military skills and the political will to replace them. More soldiers and police we've trained will join the militias. Violence and chaos will increase across the country.

As the situation continues to deteriorate in Iraq, anti-American feelings will increase. Cursed for staying, we will now be cursed for leaving. Iraq will become an ever more dangerous place for any American to be.

At home, political pressure to get out of Iraq completely will increase rapidly as the violence gets worse. The military force left behind to protect the US trainers will be drawn down to-or below-a bare minimum, further increasing the dangers for the Americans who remain. Military affairs commentator General Barry McCaffrey issued this sober warning in the December 18 Newsweek: "We're setting ourselves up for a potential national disaster in which some Iraqi divisions could flip and take 5,000 Americans hostage, or multiple advisory teams go missing in action."

Nothing destroys troop morale faster than being in a war you know is pointless. At this same stage in Vietnam, drug use among Americans became a serious problem.

Our ultimatums and conditions won't be met. As the situation gets worse, whatever remains of a central government in Baghdad will be even less able to make the compromises and form the coalitions necessary to control centuries of factional and tribal hatreds. The civil war will spiral out of control, giving us the justification we need to get out, blaming the Iraqis for the mess we've left behind. Then we will face the regional and global ramifications of a vicious civil war whose only winners will be Iran and al-Queda.

US leaders may decide, as they did 37 years ago, that we must again create a "decent interval" to mask defeat and that the PR benefits of that interval are worth the cost in lives and money. If they do, however, they should-unlike the Iraq Study Group-not lie to us that such a strategy has any military chance whatsoever of success.

John Graham is the president of the Giraffe Heroes Project and author of Outdoor Leadership, It's Up to Us: The Giraffe Heroes Program for Teens, and Stick Your Neck Out; A Street-smart Guide to Creating Change in Your Community and Beyond. He can be reached at jgraham@whidbey.com

IRAQ: Women in the resistance

The Iraqi Resistance Only Exists To End The Occupation
The Escalating Attacks Are Not Usually Aimed at Civilians, But Are a Direct Response to the Brutal Actions of US-Led Troops

by Haifa Zangana
In Muqdadiyah, 50 miles from Baghdad, a woman wearing a traditional Iraqi abaya blew herself up this week in the midst of Iraqi police recruits. This was the seventh suicide attack by a women since the Anglo-American invasion in 2003, and an act unheard of before that. Iraqi women are driven to despair and self-destruction by grief. Their expectations are reduced to pleas for help to clear the bodies of the dead from the streets, according to a report by the international committee of the Red Cross, released yesterday. It’s the same frustration that drew hundreds of thousands to demonstrate against foreign forces in Najaf on Monday.In the fifth year of occupation, the sectarian and ethnic divide between politicians, parties and their warring militias has become monstrous, turning on its creators in the Green Zone and beyond, and not sparing ordinary people. One of the consequences is a major change in the public role of women.

During the first three years of occupation women were mostly confined to their homes, protected by male relatives. But now that the savagery of their circumstances has propelled many of them to the head of their households, they are risking their lives outdoors. Since men are the main target of US-led troops, militias and death squads, black-cloaked women are seen queuing at prisons, government offices or morgues, in search of disappeared, or detained, male relatives. It is women who bury the dead. Baghdad has become a city of bereaved women. But contrary to what we are told by the occupation and its puppet regime, this is not the only city that is subject to the brutality that forces thousands of Iraqis to flee their country every month.

Bodies are found across the country from Mosul to Kirkuk to Basra. They are handcuffed, blindfolded and bullet-ridden, bearing signs of torture. They are dumped at roadsides or found floating in the Tigris or Euphrates. A friend of mine who found her brother’s body in a hospital’s fridge told me how she checked his body and was relieved. “He was not tortured”, she said. “He was just shot in the head.”

Occupation has left no room for any initiative independent of the officially sanctioned political process; for a peaceful opposition or civil society that could create networks to bridge the politically manufactured divide. Only the mosque can fulfil this role. In the absence of the state, some mosques provide basic services, running clinics or schools. In addition to the call to prayer, their loudspeakers warn people of impending attacks or to appeal for blood donors.

But these attempts to sustain a sense of community are regularly crushed. On Tuesday, troops from the Iraqi army, supported by US helicopters, raided a mosque in the heart of old Baghdad. The well-respected muazzin Abu Saif and another civilian were executed in public. Local people were outraged and attacked the troops. At the end of the day, 34 people had been killed, including a number of women and children. As usual, the summary execution and the massacre that followed were blamed on insurgents. The military statement said US and Iraqi forces were continuing to “locate, identify, and engage and kill insurgents targeting coalition and Iraqi security forces in the area”.

It is important to recognise that the resistance was born not only of ideological, religious and patriotic convictions, but also as a response to the reality of the brutal actions of the occupation and its administration. It is a response to arbitrary break-ins, humiliating searches, arrests, detention and torture. According to the Red Cross, “the number of people arrested or interned by the multinational forces has increased by 40% since early 2006. The number of people held by the Iraqi authorities has also increased significantly.”

Many of the security detainees are women who have been subjected to abuse and rape and who are often arrested as a means to force male relatives to confess to crimes they have not committed. According to the Iraqi MP Mohamed al-Dainey, there are 65 documented cases of women’s rape in occupation detention centres in 2006. Four women currently face execution - the death penalty for women was outlawed in Iraq from 1965 until 2004 - for allegedly killing security force members. These are accusations they deny and Amnesty International has challenged.

There is only one solution to this disaster, and that is for the US and Britain to accept that the Iraqi resistance is fighting to end the occupation. And to acknowlege that it consists of ordinary Iraqis, not only al-Qaida, not just Sunnis or Shias, not those terrorists - as Tony Blair called them - inspired by neighbouring countries such as Iran. To recognise that Iraqis are proud, peace-loving people, and that they hate occuption, not each other. And to understand that the main targets of the resistance are not Iraqi civilians. According to Brookings, the independent US research institute, 75% of recorded attacks are directed at occupation forces, and a further 17% at Iraqi government forces. The average number of attacks has more than doubled in the past year to about 185 a day. That is 1,300 a week, and more than 5,500 a month.

Another way of understanding this is that in any one hour, day or night, there are seven or eight new attacks. Without the Iraqi people’s support, directly and indirectly, this level of resistance would not have happened.

Haifa Zangana, an Iraqi exile who was imprisoned by Saddam Hussein, is the author of Women on a Journey: Between Baghdad and London. haifa_zangana@yahoo.co.uk

Guardian Unlimited © Guardian News and Media Limited 2007
Published on Thursday, April 12, 2007 by The Guardian/UK

Libya in six months:: Libya, Hypocrisy and Betrayal by the United Nations

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article27727.htm

Libya, Hypocrisy and Betrayal by the United Nations

By Felicity Arbuthnot

"If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face - for ever." - George Orwell.

March 19, 2011 "Information Clearing House" -- The bombing of Libya will begin on or nearly to the day, of the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the destruction of Iraq, 19th March, in Europe. Libya too will be destroyed - its schools, education system, water, infrastructure, hospitals, municipal buildings. There will be numerous "tragic mistakes", "collateral damage", mothers, fathers, children, babies, grandparents, blind and deaf schools and on and on. And the wonders of the Roman remains and earlier, largely enduring and revered in all history's turmoils as Iraq, the nation's history - and humanity's, again as Iraq and Afghanistan, will be gone, for ever.

The infrastructure will be destroyed. The embargo will remain in place, thus rebuilding will be impossible. Britain, France and the US., will decide the country needs "stabilising", "help with reconstruction." They will move in, secure the oil installations and oil fields, the Libyan people will be an incidental inconvenience and quickly become "the enemy", "insurgents", be shot, imprisoned, tortured, abused - and a US friendly puppet "government" will be installed.

The invaders will award their companies rebuilding contracts, the money - likely taken from Libya's frozen assets without accounting - will vanish and the country will remain largely in ruins.

And the loudest cheerleaders for this, as Iraq, will be running round tv and radio stations in London, Europe and the US, then returning to their safe apartments and their UK/US/Europe paid tenures, in the knowledge that no bombs will be dropping on them. Their children will not be shaking uncontrollably and soiling themselves with terror at the sound of approaching planes.

And this Libyan "Shock and Awe"? Shame on France, shame on Britain and the US and a UN avowed: "... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Every shattered body, every child maimed or blown to bits, every widow, widower, orphan, will have their name of those countries, and the UN., written in their blood in their place of death.

And the public of these murderous, marauding Western ram raiders, will be told that we were bringing democracy, liberating Libya from a tyrant, from the "new Hitler", the "Butcher of Bengazi."

The countries who have ganged together these last days to overthrow a sovereign government have, again, arguably, conspired in Nuremberg's: " ... supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole", and yet again, plotted to overthrow a sovereign government, with a fig leaf of "legality" from an arm twisted UN. We have seen it all before.

Ironically, as I write, here in the UK., on the day Prime Minister Cameron is to make an announcement in Parliament on the proposed attack on Libya, it is Red Nose Day, founded in 1988, out of 1985's Comic Relief - which came from a refugee camp in Sudan, which borders Libya - to raise money for the children in need, in Africa. This red nose day, we plan to bomb them.

In time, it will emerge, who was stirring, bribing, de-stabilizing - and likely few will be surprised at the findings. But by then, Libya will be long broken and its people, fleeing, displaced, distraught.

When it comes to dealing with the usual "liberators", be careful what you wish for. In six months or so, most Libyans, whatever the failings of the last forty years rule, will be ruing the day.

First it was Saddam. Then Gaddafi. Now there's a vacancy for the West's favourite crackpot tyrant

Robert Fisk: First it was Saddam. Then Gaddafi. Now there's a vacancy for the West's favourite crackpot tyrant

Gaddafi is completely bonkers, a crackpot on the level of Ahmadinejad and Lieberman

Saturday, 19 March 2011

So we are going to take "all necessary measures" to protect the civilians of Libya, are we? Pity we didn't think of that 42 years ago. Or 41 years ago. Or... well, you know the rest. And let's not be fooled by what the UN resolution really means. Yet again, it's going to be regime-change. And just as in Iraq – to use one of Tom Friedman's only memorable phrases of the time – when the latest dictator goes, who knows what kind of bats will come flying out of the box?

~~~

Could this be, I wonder, why we have not heard from Lord Blair of Isfahan recently? Surely he should be up there, clapping his hands with glee at another humanitarian intervention. Perhaps he is just resting between parts. Or maybe, like the dragons in Spenser's Faerie Queen, he is quietly vomiting forth Catholic tracts with all the enthusiasm of a Gaddafi in full flow.

~~~

The Middle East seems to produce these ravers – as opposed to Europe, which in the past 100 years has only produced Berlusconi, Mussolini, Stalin and the little chap who used to be a corporal in the 16th List Bavarian reserve infantry, but who went really crackers when he got elected in 1933 – but now we are cleaning up the Middle East again and can forget our own colonial past in this sandpit. And why not, when Gaddafi tells the people of Benghazi that "we will come, 'zenga, zenga' (alley by alley), house by house, room by room." Surely this is a humanitarian intervention that really, really, really is a good idea. After all, there will be no "boots on the ground".

Of course, if this revolution was being violently suppressed in, say, Mauritania, I don't think we would be demanding no-fly zones. Nor in Ivory Coast, come to think of it. Nor anywhere else in Africa that didn't have oil, gas or mineral deposits or wasn't of importance in our protection of Israel, the latter being the real reason we care so much about Egypt.
~~~~

And what if we are simply not in time, if Gaddafi's tanks keep on rolling? Do we then send in our mercenaries to help the "rebels". Do we set up temporary shop in Benghazi, with advisers and NGOs and the usual diplomatic flummery? Note how, at this most critical moment, we are no longer talking about the tribes of Libya, those hardy warrior people whom we invoked with such enthusiasm a couple of weeks ago. We talk now about the need to protect "the Libyan people", no longer registering the Senoussi, the most powerful group of tribal families in Benghazi, whose men have been doing much of the fighting. King Idris, overthrown by Gaddafi in 1969, was a Senoussi. The red, black and green "rebel" flag – the old flag of pre-revolutionary Libya – is in fact the Idris flag, a Senoussi flag. Now let's suppose they get to Tripoli (the point of the whole exercise, is it not?), are they going to be welcomed there? Yes, there were protests in the capital. But many of those brave demonstrators themselves originally came from Benghazi. What will Gaddafi's supporters do? "Melt away"? Suddenly find that they hated Gaddafi after all and join the revolution? Or continue the civil war?

~~~~

It is all wearingly familiar. And now we are back at it again, banging our desks in spiritual unity. We don't have many options, do we, unless we want to see another Srebrenica? But hold on. Didn't that happen long after we had imposed our "no-fly" zone over Bosnia?

for full article: http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-first-it-was-saddam-then-gaddafi-now-theres-a-vacancy-for-the-wests-favourite-crackpot-tyrant-2246415.html

Michael Moore: get out of Iraq NOW

Published on Monday, November 27, 2006 by Michael Moore.com
Cut and Run, the Only Brave Thing to Do ...
by Michael Moore

Tomorrow marks the day that we will have been in Iraq longer than we were in all of World War II.
That's right. We were able to defeat all of Nazi Germany, Mussolini, and the entire Japanese empire in LESS time than it's taken the world's only superpower to secure the road from the airport to downtown Baghdad.

And we haven't even done THAT. After 1,347 days, in the same time it took us to took us to sweep across North Africa, storm the beaches of Italy, conquer the South Pacific, and liberate all of Western Europe, we cannot, after over 3 and 1/2 years, even take over a single highway and protect ourselves from a homemade device of two tin cans placed in a pothole. No wonder the cab fare from the airport into Baghdad is now running around $35,000 for the 25-minute ride. And that doesn't even include a friggin' helmet.

Is this utter failure the fault of our troops? Hardly. That's because no amount of troops or choppers or democracy shot out of the barrel of a gun is ever going to "win" the war in Iraq. It is a lost war, lost because it never had a right to be won, lost because it was started by men who have never been to war, men who hide behind others sent to fight and die.

Let's listen to what the Iraqi people are saying, according to a recent poll conducted by the University of Maryland:

** 71% of all Iraqis now want the U.S. out of Iraq.

** 61% of all Iraqis SUPPORT insurgent attacks on U.S. troops.

Yes, the vast majority of Iraqi citizens believe that our soldiers should be killed and maimed! So what the hell are we still doing there? Talk about not getting the hint.

There are many ways to liberate a country. Usually the residents of that country rise up and liberate themselves. That's how we did it. You can also do it through nonviolent, mass civil disobedience. That's how India did it. You can get the world to boycott a regime until they are so ostracized they capitulate. That's how South Africa did it. Or you can just wait them out and, sooner or later, the king's legions simply leave (sometimes just because they're too cold). That's how Canada did it.

The one way that DOESN'T work is to invade a country and tell the people, "We are here to liberate you!" -- when they have done NOTHING to liberate themselves. Where were all the suicide bombers when Saddam was oppressing them? Where were the insurgents planting bombs along the roadside as the evildoer Saddam's convoy passed them by? I guess ol' Saddam was a cruel despot -- but not cruel enough for thousands to risk their necks. "Oh no, Mike, they couldn't do that! Saddam would have had them killed!" Really? You don't think King George had any of the colonial insurgents killed? You don't think Patrick Henry or Tom Paine were afraid? That didn't stop them. When tens of thousands aren't willing to shed their own blood to remove a dictator, that should be the first clue that they aren't going to be willing participants when you decide you're going to do the liberating for them.

A country can HELP another people overthrow a tyrant (that's what the French did for us in our revolution), but after you help them, you leave. Immediately. The French didn't stay and tell us how to set up our government. They didn't say, "we're not leaving because we want your natural resources." They left us to our own devices and it took us six years before we had an election. And then we had a bloody civil war. That's what happens, and history is full of these examples. The French didn't say, "Oh, we better stay in America, otherwise they're going to kill each other over that slavery issue!"

The only way a war of liberation has a chance of succeeding is if the oppressed people being liberated have their own citizens behind them -- and a group of Washingtons, Jeffersons, Franklins, Ghandis and Mandellas leading them. Where are these beacons of liberty in Iraq? This is a joke and it's been a joke since the beginning. Yes, the joke's been on us, but with 655,000 Iraqis now dead as a result of our invasion (source: Johns Hopkins University), I guess the cruel joke is on them. At least they've been liberated, permanently.

So I don't want to hear another word about sending more troops (wake up, America, John McCain is bonkers), or "redeploying" them, or waiting four months to begin the "phase-out." There is only one solution and it is this: Leave. Now. Start tonight. Get out of there as fast as we can. As much as people of good heart and conscience don't want to believe this, as much as it kills us to accept defeat, there is nothing we can do to undo the damage we have done. What's happened has happened. If you were to drive drunk down the road and you killed a child, there would be nothing you could do to bring that child back to life. If you invade and destroy a country, plunging it into a civil war, there isn’t much you can do ‘til the smoke settles and blood is mopped up. Then maybe you can atone for the atrocity you have committed and help the living come back to a better life.

The Soviet Union got out of Afghanistan in 36 weeks. They did so and suffered hardly any losses as they left. They realized the mistake they had made and removed their troops. A civil war ensued. The bad guys won. Later, we overthrew the bad guys and everybody lived happily ever after. See! It all works out in the end!

The responsibility to end this war now falls upon the Democrats. Congress controls the purse strings and the Constitution says only Congress can declare war. Mr. Reid and Ms. Pelosi now hold the power to put an end to this madness. Failure to do so will bring the wrath of the voters. We aren't kidding around, Democrats, and if you don't believe us, just go ahead and continue this war another month. We will fight you harder than we did the Republicans. The opening page of my website has a photo of Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid, each made up by a collage of photos of the American soldiers who have died in Bush's War. But it is now about to become the Bush/Democratic Party War unless swift action is taken.

This is what we demand:

1. Bring the troops home now. Not six months from now. NOW. Quit looking for a way to win. We can't win. We've lost. Sometimes you lose. This is one of those times. Be brave and admit it.

2. Apologize to our soldiers and make amends. Tell them we are sorry they were used to fight a war that had NOTHING to do with our national security. We must commit to taking care of them so that they suffer as little as possible. The mentally and physically maimed must get the best care and significant financial compensation. The families of the deceased deserve the biggest apology and they must be taken care of for the rest of their lives.

3. We must atone for the atrocity we have perpetuated on the people of Iraq. There are few evils worse than waging a war based on a lie, invading another country because you want what they have buried under the ground. Now many more will die. Their blood is on our hands, regardless for whom we voted. If you pay taxes, you have contributed to the three billion dollars a week now being spent to drive Iraq into the hellhole it's become. When the civil war is over, we will have to help rebuild Iraq. We can receive no redemption until we have atoned.

In closing, there is one final thing I know. We Americans are better than what has been done in our name. A majority of us were upset and angry after 9/11 and we lost our minds. We didn't think straight and we never looked at a map. Because we are kept stupid through our pathetic education system and our lazy media, we knew nothing of history. We didn't know that WE were the ones funding and arming Saddam for many years, including those when he massacred the Kurds. He was our guy. We didn't know what a Sunni or a Shiite was, never even heard the words. Eighty percent of our young adults (according to National Geographic) were not able to find Iraq on the map. Our leaders played off our stupidity, manipulated us with lies, and scared us to death.

But at our core we are a good people. We may be slow learners, but that "Mission Accomplished" banner struck us as odd, and soon we began to ask some questions. Then we began to get smart. By this past November 7th, we got mad and tried to right our wrongs. The majority now know the truth. The majority now feel a deep sadness and guilt and a hope that somehow we can make make it all right again.

Unfortunately, we can't. So we will accept the consequences of our actions and do our best to be there should the Iraqi people ever dare to seek our help in the future. We ask for their forgiveness.

We demand the Democrats listen to us and get out of Iraq now.

Yours,
Michael Moore

The Gulag Archipelego: America, Britain and CIAs global network of secret prisons

Published on Tuesday, December 12, 2006 by the Guardian / UK
Routine and Systematic Torture Is at the Heart of America's War on Terror
In the fight against cruelty, barbarism and extremism, America has embraced the very evils it claims to confront

by George Monbiot

After thousands of years of practice, you might have imagined that every possible means of inflicting pain had already been devised. But you should never underestimate the human capacity for invention. United States interrogators, we now discover, have found a new way of destroying a human being.

Last week, defence lawyers acting for José Padilla, a US citizen detained as an "enemy combatant", released a video showing a mission fraught with deadly risk - taking him to the prison dentist. A group of masked guards in riot gear shackled his legs and hands, blindfolded him with black-out goggles and shut off his hearing with headphones, then marched him down the prison corridor.

Is Padilla really that dangerous? Far from it: his warders describe him as so docile and inactive that he could be mistaken for "a piece of furniture". The purpose of these measures appeared to be to sustain the regime under which he had lived for more than three years: total sensory deprivation. He had been kept in a blacked-out cell, unable to see or hear anything beyond it. Most importantly, he had had no human contact, except for being bounced off the walls from time to time by his interrogators. As a result, he appears to have lost his mind. I don't mean this metaphorically. I mean that his mind is no longer there.

The forensic psychiatrist who examined him says that he "does not appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him, is unable to render assistance to counsel, and has impairments in reasoning as the result of a mental illness, ie, post-traumatic stress disorder, complicated by the neuropsychiatric effects of prolonged isolation". José Padilla appears to have been lobotomised: not medically, but socially.

If this was an attempt to extract information, it was ineffective: the authorities held him without charge for three and half years. Then, threatened by a supreme court ruling, they suddenly dropped their claims that he was trying to detonate a dirty bomb. They have now charged him with some vague and lesser offences to do with support for terrorism. He is unlikely to be the only person subjected to this regime. Another "enemy combatant", Ali al-Marri, claims to have been subject to the same total isolation and sensory deprivation, in the same naval prison in South Carolina. God knows what is being done to people who have disappeared into the CIA's foreign oubliettes.

That the US tortures, routinely and systematically, while prosecuting its "war on terror" can no longer be seriously disputed. The Detainee Abuse and Accountability Project (DAA), a coalition of academics and human-rights groups, has documented the abuse or killing of 460 inmates of US military prisons in Afghanistan, Iraq and at Guantánamo Bay. This, it says, is necessarily a conservative figure: many cases will remain unrecorded. The prisoners were beaten, raped, forced to abuse themselves, forced to maintain "stress positions", and subjected to prolonged sleep deprivation and mock executions.

The New York Times reports that prisoners held by the US military at Bagram airbase in Afghanistan were made to stand for up to 13 days with their hands chained to the ceiling, naked, hooded and unable to sleep. The Washington Post alleges that prisoners at the same airbase were "commonly blindfolded and thrown into walls, bound in painful positions, subjected to loud noises and deprived of sleep" while kept, like Padilla and the arrivals at Guantánamo, "in black hoods or spray-painted goggles".

Alfred McCoy, professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, argues that the photographs released from the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq reflect standard CIA torture techniques: "stress positions, sensory deprivation, and sexual humiliation". The famous picture of the hooded man standing on a box, with wires attached to his fingers, shows two of these techniques being used at once. Unable to see, he has no idea how much time has passed or what might be coming next. He stands in a classic stress position - maintained for several hours, it causes excruciating pain. He appears to have been told that if he drops his arms he will be electrocuted. What went wrong at Abu Ghraib is that someone took photos. Everything else was done by the book.

Neither the military nor the civilian authorities have broken much sweat in investigating these crimes. A few very small fish have been imprisoned; a few others have been fined or reduced in rank; in most cases the authorities have either failed to investigate or failed to prosecute. The DAA points out that no officer has yet been held to account for torture practised by his subordinates. US torturers appear to enjoy impunity, until they are stupid enough to take pictures of each other.

But Padilla's treatment also reflects another glorious American tradition: solitary confinement. Some 25,000 US prisoners are currently held in isolation - a punishment only rarely used in other democracies. In some places, like the federal prison in Florence, Colorado, they are kept in sound-proofed cells and might scarcely see another human being for years on end. They may touch or be touched by no one. Some people have been kept in solitary confinement in the US for more than 20 years.

At Pelican Bay in California, where 1,200 people are held in the isolation wing, inmates are confined to tiny cells for 22 and a half hours a day, then released into an "exercise yard" for "recreation". The yard consists of a concrete well about 3.5 metres in length with walls 6 metres high and a metal grille across the sky. The recreation consists of pacing back and forth, alone.

The results are much as you would expect. As National Public Radio reveals, more than 10% of the isolation prisoners at Pelican Bay are now in the psychiatric ward, and there's a waiting list. Prisoners in solitary confinement, according to Dr Henry Weinstein, a psychiatrist who studies them, suffer from "memory loss to severe anxiety to hallucinations to delusions ... under the severest cases of sensory deprivation, people go crazy." People who went in bad and dangerous come out mad as well. The only two studies conducted so far - in Texas and Washington state - both show that the recidivism rates for prisoners held in solitary confinement are worse than for those who were allowed to mix with other prisoners. If we were to judge the US by its penal policies, we would perceive a strange beast: a Christian society that believes in neither forgiveness nor redemption.

From this delightful experiment, US interrogators appear to have extracted a useful lesson: if you want to erase a man's mind, deprive him of contact with the rest of the world. This has nothing to do with obtaining information: torture of all kinds - physical or mental - produces the result that people will say anything to make it end. It is about power, and the thrilling discovery that in the right conditions one man's power over another is unlimited. It is an indulgence which turns its perpetrators into everything they claim to be confronting.

President Bush maintains that he is fighting a war against threats to the "values of civilised nations": terror, cruelty, barbarism and extremism. He asked his nation's interrogators to discover where these evils are hidden. They should congratulate themselves. They appear to have succeeded.

© Guardian News and Media Limited 2006

Trying again! Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency

Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency
by
David Kilcullen
This paper reflects the author‘s personal judgments and does not represent the views of any
department or agency of the U.S. Government or any other government.

Introduction
Your company has just been warned for deployment on counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence and Robert Thompson. You have studied FM 3-24 and now understand the history, philosophy and theory of counterinsurgency.

You watched Black Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers, and you know this will be the most difficult challenge of your life. But what does all the theory mean, at the company level? How do the principles translate into action œ at night, with the GPS down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you don‘t understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos? How does counterinsurgency actually happen? There are no universal answers, and insurgents are among the most adaptive opponents you will ever face. Countering them will demand every ounce of your intellect. But be comforted: you are not the first to feel this way. There are tactical fundamentals you can apply, to link the theory with the techniques and procedures you already know.

What is counterinsurgency?
If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: this is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything weaker than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people and societal disruption that fuels and perpetuates the insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. For your side to win, the people do not have to like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security. In this battlefield popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than a hundred
tanks.
Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience: the distilled essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity œ but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically.

Preparation
Time is short during pre-deployment, but you will never have more time to think than you have now. Now is your chance to prepare yourself and your command.

1. Know your turf. Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district. If you don‘t know precisely where you will be operating, study the general area. Read the map like a book: study it every night before sleep, and re-draw it from memory every morning, until you understand its patterns intuitively. Develop a mental model of your area œ a framework in which to fit every new piece of knowledge you acquire. Study handover notes from predecessors; better still, get in touch with the unit in theater and pick their brains. In an ideal world, intelligence officers and area experts would brief you. This rarely happens: and even if it does, there is no substitute for personal mastery. Understand the broader —area of influence“ œ this can be a wide area, particularly when insurgents draw on 'global' grievances. Share out aspects of the operational area among platoon leaders and non-commissioned officers: have each individual develop a personal specialization and brief the others. Neglect this knowledge, and it will kill you.

2. Diagnose the problem. Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose the problem. Who are the insurgents? What drives them? What makes local leaders tick? Counterinsurgency is fundamentally a competition between many groups, each seeking to mobilize the population in support of their agenda œ counterinsurgency is always more than two-sided. So you must understand what motivates the people and how to mobilize them. You need to know why and how the insurgents are getting followers. This means you need to know your real enemy, not a cardboard cut-out. The enemy is adaptive, resourceful and probably grew up in the region where you will operate. The locals have known him since he was a boy œ how long have they known you? Your worst opponent is not the psychopathic terrorist of Hollywood, it is the charismatic follow-me warrior who would make your best platoon leader. His followers are not misled or naïve: much of his success is due to bad government policies or security forces that alienate the population. Work this problem collectively with your platoon and squad leaders. Discuss ideas, explore the problem, understand what you are facing, and seek a consensus. If this sounds un-military, get over it. Once you are in theater, situations will arise too quickly for orders, or even commander‘s intent. Corporals and privates will have to make snap judgments with strategic impact. The only way to help them is to give them a shared understanding, then trust them to think for themselves on the day.

3. Organize for intelligence. In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary. Your operations will be intelligence driven, but intelligence will come mostly from your own operations, not as a —product“ prepared and served up by higher headquarters. So you must organize for intelligence. You will need a company S2 and intelligence section œ including analysts. You may need platoon S2s and S3s, and you will need a reconnaissance and surveillance element. You will not have enough linguists œ you never do œ but consider carefully where best to employ them. Linguists are a battle-winning asset: but like any other scarce resource you must have a prioritized —bump plan“ in case you lose them. Often during pre-deployment the best use of linguists is to train your command in basic language. You will probably not get augmentation for all this: but you must still do it. Put the smartest soldiers in the S2 section and the R&S squad. You will have one less rifle squad: but the intelligence section will pay for itself in lives and effort saved.

4. Organize for inter-agency operations. Almost everything in counterinsurgency is inter-agency. And everything important œ from policing to intelligence to civil-military operations to trash collection œ will involve your company working with civilian actors and local indigenous partners you cannot control, but whose success is essential for yours. Train the company in inter-agency operations œ get a briefing from the State Department, aid agencies and the local Police or Fire Brigade. Train point-men in each squad to deal with the inter-agency. Realize that civilians find rifles, helmets and body armor intimidating. Learn how not to scare them. Ask others who come from that country or culture about your ideas. See it through the eyes of a civilian who knows nothing about the military.

How would you react if foreigners came to your neighborhood and conducted the operations you planned? What if somebody came to your mother‘s house and did that? Most importantly, know that your operations will create temporary breathing space, but long-term development and stabilization by civilian agencies will ultimately win the war.

5. Travel light and harden your CSS. You will be weighed down with body armor, rations, extra ammunition, communications gear, and a thousand other things. The enemy will carry a rifle or RPG, a shemagh and a water bottle if he is lucky. Unless you ruthlessly lighten your load and enforce a culture of speed and mobility, the insurgents will consistently out-run and out-maneuver you. But in lightening your load, make sure you can always —reach back“ to call for firepower or heavy support if needed. Also, remember to harden your CSS. The enemy will attack your weakest points. Most attacks on coalition forces in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, outside pre-planned combat actions like the two battles of Fallujah or Operation Iron Horse, were against CSS installations and convoys. You do the math. Ensure your CSS assets are hardened, have communications, and are trained in combat operations. They may do more fighting than your rifle squads.

6. Find a political/cultural adviser. In a force optimized for counterinsurgency, you might receive a political/cultural adviser at company level: a diplomat or military foreign area officer, able to speak the language and navigate the intricacies of local politics. Back on planet Earth, the Corps and Division commander will get a POLAD: you will not, so you must improvise. Find a political/cultural adviser from among your people œ perhaps an officer, perhaps not (see article 8). Someone with people skills and a —feel“ for the environment will do better than a political science graduate. Don‘t try to be your own cultural adviser: you must be fully aware of the political and cultural dimension, but this is a different task. Also, don‘t give one of your intelligence people this role. They can help, but their task is to understand the environment œ the political adviser‘s job is to help shape it.

7. Train the squad leaders œ then trust them. Counterinsurgency is a squad and platoon leader‘s war, and often a private soldier‘s war. Battles are won or lost in moments: whoever can bring combat power to bear in seconds, on a street corner, will win. The commander on the spot controls the fight. You must train the squad leaders to act intelligently and independently without orders. If your squad leaders are competent, you can get away with average company or platoon staffs. The reverse is not the case. Training should focus on basic skills: marksmanship, patrolling, security on the move and at the halt, basic drills. When in doubt, spend less time on company and platoon training, and more time on squads. Ruthlessly replace leaders who do not make the grade. But once people are trained, and you have a shared operational —diagnosis“, you must trust them. We talk about this, but few company or platoon leaders really trust their people. In counterinsurgency, you have no choice.

8. Rank is nothing: talent is everything. Not everyone is good at counterinsurgency. Many people don‘t understand the concept, and some who do can‘t execute it. It is difficult, and in a conventional force only a few people will master it. Anyone can learn the basics, but a few —naturals“ do exist. Learn how to spot these people and put them into positions where they can make a difference. Rank matters far less than talent œ a few good men under a smart junior non-commissioned officer can succeed in counterinsurgency, where hundreds of well-armed soldiers under a mediocre senior officer will fail.

9. Have a game plan. The final preparation task is to develop a game plan: a mental picture of how you see the operation developing. You will be tempted to try and do this too early. But wait: as your knowledge improves, you will get a better idea of what needs to be done, and of your own limitations. Like any plan, this plan will change once you hit the ground, and may need to be scrapped if there is a major shift in the environment. But you still need a plan, and the process of planning will give you a simple robust idea of what to achieve, even if the methods change. This is sometimes called —operational design“. One approach is to identify basic stages in your operation: e.g. —establish dominance, build local networks, marginalize the enemy“. Make sure you can easily transition between phases, both forward and backward in case of setbacks. Just as the insurgent can adapt his activity to yours, you must have a simple enough plan to survive setbacks without collapsing. This plan is the —solution“ that matches the shared —diagnosis“ you developed earlier œ it must be simple, and known to everyone.

The Golden Hour
You have deployed, completed reception and staging, and (if you are lucky) attended the in-country counterinsurgency school. Now it is time to enter your sector and start your tour. This is the golden hour. Mistakes made now will haunt you for the rest of the tour, while early successes will set the tone for victory. You will look back on your early actions and cringe at your clumsiness. So be it: but you must act.

10. Be there. The first rule of deployment in counterinsurgency is to be there. You can almost never outrun the enemy. If you are not present when an incident happens, there is usually little you can do about it. So your first order of business is to establish presence. If you cannot do this throughout your sector, then do it wherever you can. This demands a residential approach œ living in your sector, in close proximity to the population, rather than raiding into the area from remote, secure bases. Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling: all these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people they can trust and do business with, not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy œ day-tripping like a tourist in hell œ degrades situational awareness, makes you a target and is ultimately more dangerous.

11. Avoid knee jerk responses to first impressions. Don‘t act rashly, get the facts first. The violence you see may be part of the insurgent strategy, it may be various interest groups fighting it out, or it may be people settling personal vendettas. Or, it may just be daily life: —normality“ in Kandahar is not the same as in Kansas. So you need time to learn what normality looks like. The insurgent commander also wants to goad you into lashing out at the population or making a mistake. Unless you happen to be on the spot when an incident occurs, you will have only second-hand reports and may misunderstand the local context or interpretation. This fragmentation and —disaggregation“ of the battlefield œ particularly in urban areas œ means that first impressions are often highly misleading. Of course, you cannot avoid making judgments. But if possible, check them with an older hand or a trusted local. If you can, keep one or two officers from your predecessor unit for the first part of the tour. Try to avoid a rush to judgment.

12. Prepare for handover from Day One. Believe it or not, you will not resolve the insurgency on your watch. Your tour will end, and your successors will need your corporate knowledge. Start handover folders, in every platoon and specialist squad, from day one œ ideally, you would have inherited these from your predecessors, but if not you must start them. The folders should include lessons learned, details about the population, village and patrol reports, updated maps, photographs œ anything that will help newcomers master the environment. Computerized databases are fine, but keep good back-ups and ensure you have hard copy of key artifacts and documents. This is boring, tedious and essential. Over time, you will create a corporate memory that keeps your people alive.

13. Build trusted networks. Once you have settled into your sector, your next task is to build trusted networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase —hearts and minds“, which comprises two separate components. —Hearts“ means persuading people their best interests are served by your success; —Minds“ means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has to do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, if you successfully build networks of trust, these will grow like roots into the population, displacing the enemy‘s networks, bringing him out into the open to fight you, and seizing the initiative. These networks include local allies, community leaders, local security forces, NGOs and other friendly or neutral non-state actors in your area, and the media. Conduct village and neighborhood surveys to identify needs in the community œ then follow through to meet them, build common interests and mobilize popular support. This is your true main effort: everything else is secondary. Actions that help build trusted networks serve your cause. Actions œ even killing high-profile targets œ that undermine trust or disrupt your networks help the enemy.

14. Start easy. If you were trained in maneuver warfare you know about surfaces and gaps. This applies to counterinsurgency as much as any other form of maneuver. Don‘t try to crack the hardest nut first œ don‘t go straight for the main insurgent stronghold, try to provoke a decisive showdown, or focus efforts on villages that support the insurgents. Instead, start from secure areas and work gradually outwards. Do this by extending your influence through the locals‘ own networks. Go with, not against, the grain of local society: first win the confidence of a few villages, and then see who they trade, intermarry or do business with. Now win these people over. Soon enough the showdown with the insurgents will come. But now you have local allies, a mobilized population and a trusted network at your back. Do it the other way round and no one will mourn your failure.

15. Seek early victories. In this early phase, your aim is to stamp your dominance in your sector. Do this by seeking an early victory. This will probably not translate into a combat victory over the enemy: looking for such a victory can be overly aggressive and create collateral damage œ especially since you really do not yet understand your sector. Also, such a combat victory depends on the enemy being stupid enough to present you with a clear-cut target, a rare windfall in counterinsurgency. Instead, you may achieve a victory by resolving long-standing issues your predecessors have failed to address, or co-opting a key local leader who has resisted cooperation with our forces. Like any other form of armed propaganda, achieving even a small victory early in the tour sets the tone for what comes later, and helps seize the initiative œ which you have probably lost due to the inevitable hiatus entailed by the handover-takeover with your predecessor.

16. Practise deterrent patrolling. Establish patrolling methods that deter the enemy from attacking you. Often our patrolling approach seems designed to provoke, then defeat, enemy attacks. This is counter-productive: it leads to a raiding, day-tripping mindset or, worse, a bunker mentality. Instead, practise deterrent patrolling. There are many methods for this, including —multiple“ patrolling where you flood an area with numerous small patrols working together. Each is too small to be a worthwhile target, and the insurgents never know where all the patrols are œ making an attack on any one patrol extremely risky. Other methods include so-called —blue-green“ patrolling, where you mount daylight overt humanitarian patrols, which go covert at night and hunt specific targets. Again, the aim is to keep the enemy off balance, and the population reassured, through constant and unpredictable activity œ which, over time, deters attacks and creates a more permissive environment. A reasonable rule of thumb is that one to two thirds of your force should be on patrol at any time, day or night.

17. Be prepared for setbacks. Setbacks are normal in counterinsurgency, as in every other form of war. You will make mistakes, lose people, or occasionally kill or detain the wrong person. You may fail in building or expanding networks. If this happens, don‘t lose heart. Simply drop back to the previous phase of your game plan and recover your balance. It is normal in company counterinsurgency operations for some platoons to be doing well, while others do badly. This is not necessarily evidence of failure. Give local commanders the freedom to adjust their posture to local conditions. This creates elasticity that helps you survive setbacks.

18. Remember the global audience. One of the biggest differences between the counterinsurgencies our fathers fought and those we face today is the omnipresence of globalized media. Most houses in Iraq have one or more satellite dishes. Web bloggers, print, radio and television reporters and others are monitoring and commenting on your every move. When the insurgents ambush your patrols or set off a car bomb, they do so not to destroy one more track, but because they want graphic images of a burning vehicle and dead bodies for the evening news. Beware the —scripted enemy“, who plays to a global audience and seeks to defeat you in the court of global public opinion. You counter this by training people to always bear in mind the global audience, assume that everything they say or do will be publicized, and befriend the media. Get the press on-side: help them get their story, and trade information with them. Good relationships with non-embedded media œ especially indigenous media œdramatically increase your situational awareness, and help get your message across to the global and local audience.

19. Engage the women, beware the children. Most insurgent fighters are men. But in traditional societies, women are hugely influential in forming the social networks that insurgents use for support. Co-opting neutral or friendly women, through targeted social and economic programs, builds networks of enlightened self-interest that eventually undermine the insurgents. You need your own female counterinsurgents, including inter-agency people, to do this effectively. Win the women, and you own the family unit. Own the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the population. Conversely, though, stop your people fraternizing with local children. Your troops are homesick; they want to drop their guard with the kids. But children are sharp-eyed, lacking in empathy, and willing to commit atrocities their elders would shrink from. The insurgents are watching: they will notice a growing friendship between one of your people and a local child, and either harm the child as punishment, or use them against you. Similarly, stop people throwing candies or presents to children. It attracts them to our vehicles, creates crowds the enemy can exploit, and leads to children being run over. Harden your heart and keep the children at arm‘s length.

20. Take stock regularly. You probably already know that a —body count“ tells you little, because you usually cannot know how many insurgents there were to start with, how many moved into the area, transferred from supporter to combatant status or how many new fighters the conflict has created. But you still need to develop metrics early in the tour and refine them as the operation progresses. They should cover a range of social, informational, military and economic issues. Use metrics intelligently to form an overall impression of progress œ not in a mechanistic —traffic light“ fashion. Typical metrics include: percentage of engagements initiated by our forces versus those initiated by insurgents; longevity of friendly local leaders in positions of authority; number and quality of tip-offs on insurgent activity that originate spontaneously from the population; economic activity at markets and shops. These mean virtually nothing as a snapshot trends over time are the true indicators of progress in your sector.

Groundhog Day
Now you are in —steady state“. You are established in your sector, and people are settling into that —groundhog day“ mentality that hits every unit at some stage during every tour. It will probably take people at least the first third of the tour to become effective in the environment, if not longer. Then in the last period you will struggle against the short-timer mentality. So this middle part of the tour is the most productive œ but keeping the flame alive, and bringing the local population along with you, takes immense leadership.

21. Exploit a —single narrative“. Since counterinsurgency is a competition to mobilize popular support, it pays to know how people are mobilized. In most societies there are opinion-makers: local leaders, pillars of the community, religious figures, media personalities, and others who set trends and influence public perceptions. This influence œ including the pernicious influence of the insurgents œ often takes the form of a —single narrative“: a simple, unifying, easily-expressed story or explanation that organizes people‘s experience and provides a framework for understanding events. Nationalist and ethnic historical myths, or sectarian creeds, provide such a narrative. The Iraqi insurgents have one, as do al-Qa‘ida and the Taliban. To undercut their influence you must exploit an alternative narrative: or better yet, tap into an existing narrative that excludes the insurgents. This narrative is often worked out for you by higher headquarters œ but only you have the detailed knowledge to tailor the narrative to local conditions and generate leverage from it. For example, you might use a nationalist narrative to marginalize foreign fighters in your area, or a narrative of national redemption to undermine former regime elements that have been terrorizing the population. At the company level, you do this in baby steps, by getting to know local opinion-makers, winning their trust, learning what motivates them and building on this to find a single narrative that emphasizes the inevitability and rightness of your ultimate success. This is art, not science.

22. Local forces should mirror the enemy, not ourselves. By this stage, you will be working closely with local forces, training or supporting them, and building indigenous capability. The natural tendency is to build forces in our own image, with the aim of eventually handing our role over to them. This is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy‘s capabilities, and seek to supplant the insurgent‘s role. This does not mean they should be—irregular“ in the sense of being brutal, or outside proper control. Rather, they should move, equip and organize like the insurgents œ but have access to your support and be under the firm control of their parent societies. Combined with a mobilized population and trusted networks, this allows local forces to —hard-wire“ the enemy out of the environment, under top-cover from you. At the company level, this means that raising, training and employing local indigenous auxiliary forces (police and military) are valid tasks. This requires high-level clearance, of course, but if support is given, you should establish a company training cell. Platoons should aim to train one local squad, then use that squad as a nucleus for a partner platoon, and company headquarters should train an indigenous leadership team. This mirrors the—growth“ process of other trusted networks, and tends to emerge naturally as you win local allies œ who want to take up arms in their own defense.

23. Practise armed civil affairs. Counterinsurgency is armed social work; an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes civil affairs a central counterinsurgency activity, not an afterthought. It is how you restructure the environment to displace the enemy from it. In your company sector, civil affairs must focus on meeting basic needs first, then progress up Maslow‘s hierarchy as each successive need is met. A series of village or neighborhood surveys, regularly updated, are an invaluable tool to help understand the populations‘ needs, and track progress in meeting them over time. You need intimate cooperation with inter-agency partners here œ national, international and local. You will not be able to control these partners œ many NGOs, for example, do not want to be too closely associated with you because they need to preserve their perceived neutrality. Instead, you need to work on a shared diagnosis of the problem, building a consensus that helps you self-synchronize. Your role is to provide protection, identify needs, facilitate civil affairs and use improvements in social conditions as leverage to build networks and mobilize the population. Thus, there is no such thing as impartial humanitarian assistance or civil affairs in counterinsurgency. Every time you help someone, you hurt someone else œ not least the insurgents. So civil and humanitarian assistance personnel will be targeted. Protecting them is a matter not only of close-in defense, but also of creating a permissive operating environment by co-opting the beneficiaries of aid œ local communities and leaders œ to help you help them.

24. Small is beautiful. Another natural tendency is to go for large-scale, mass programs. In particular, we have a tendency to template ideas that succeed in one area and transplant them into another, and we tend to take small programs that work and try to replicate them on a larger scale. Again, this is usually a mistake œ often programs succeed because of specific local conditions of which we are unaware, or because their very smallness kept them below the enemy‘s radar and helped them flourish unmolested. At the company level, programs that succeed in one district often also succeed in another (because the overall company sector is small), but small-scale projects rarely proceed smoothly into large programs. Keep programs small: this makes them cheap, sustainable, low-key and (importantly) recoverable if they fail. You can add new programs œ also small, cheap and tailored to local conditions œ as the situation allows.

25. Fight the enemy‘s strategy, not his forces. At this stage, if things are proceeding well,
the insurgents will go over to the offensive. Yes, the offensive œ because you have created a situation so dangerous to the insurgents, by threatening to displace them from the environment, that they have to attack you and the population to get back into the game. Thus it is normal, even in the most successful operations, to have spikes of offensive insurgent activity late in the campaign. This does not necessarily mean you have done something wrong (though it may: it depends on whether you have successfully mobilized the population). At this point the tendency is to go for the jugular and seek to destroy the enemy‘s forces in open battle. This is rarely the best choice at company level, because provoking major combat usually plays into the enemy‘s hands by undermining the population‘s confidence. Instead, attack the enemy‘s strategy: if he is seeking to recapture the allegiance of a segment of the local population, then co-opt them against him. If he is trying to provoke a sectarian conflict, go over to —peace enforcement mode“. The permutations are endless but the principle is the same œ fight the enemy‘s strategy, not his forces.

26. Build your own solution œ only attack the enemy when he gets in the way.. Try not to be distracted, or forced into a series of reactive moves, by a desire to kill or capture the insurgents. Your aim should be to implement your own solution œ the —game plan“ you developed early in the campaign, and then refined through interaction with local partners. Your approach must be environment-centric (based on dominating the whole district and implementing a solution to its systemic problems) rather than enemy-centric. This means that, particularly late in the campaign, you may need to learn to negotiate with the enemy. Members of the population that supports you also know the enemy‘s leaders œ they may have grown up together in the small district that is now your company sector œ and valid negotiating partners sometimes emerge as the campaign progresses. Again, you need close inter-agency relationships to exploit opportunities to coopt segments of the enemy. This helps you wind down the insurgency without alienating potential local allies who have relatives or friends in the insurgent movement. At this stage, a defection is better than a surrender, a surrender is better than a capture, and a capture is better than a kill.

Getting Short
Time is short, and the tour is drawing to a close. The key problem now is keeping your people focused, preventing them from dropping their guard and maintaining the rage on all the multifarious programs, projects and operations that you have started. In this final phase, the previous articles still stand, but there is an important new one:

27. Keep your extraction plan secret. The temptation to talk about home becomes almost unbearable toward the end of a tour. The locals know you are leaving, and probably have a better idea than you of the generic extraction plan œ remember, they have seen units come and go. But you must protect the specific details of the extraction plan, or the enemy will use this as an opportunity to score a high-profile hit, re-capture the population‘s allegiance by scare tactics that convince them they will not be protected once you leave, or persuade them that your successor unit will be oppressive or incompetent. Keep the details secret, within a tightly controlled compartment in your headquarters. And resist the temptation to say goodbye to local allies: you can always send a postcard from home.

Four —What Ifs“
The articles above describe what should happen, but we all know that things go wrong. Here are some —what ifs“ to consider:

What if you get moved to a different area? You prepared for ar-Ramadi and studied Dulaim tribal structures and Sunni beliefs. Now you are going to Najaf and will be surrounded by al-Hassan and Unizzah tribes and Shi‘a communities. But that work was not wasted. In mastering your first area, you learned techniques you can apply: how to —case“ an operational area, how to decide what matters in the local societal structure. Do the same again œ and this time the process is easier and faster, since you have an existing mental structure, and can focus on what is different. The same applies if you get moved frequently within a battalion or brigade area.

What if higher headquarters doesn‘t —get“ counterinsurgency? Higher headquarters is telling you the mission is to —kill terrorist“, or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a base-camp mentality. They just do not seem to understand counterinsurgency. This is not uncommon, since company-grade officers today often have more combat experience than senior officers. In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create expectations that higher headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage —first do no harm“. Over time, you will find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher headquarters about your locations or activities: they own the indirect fires.

What if you have no resources? Yours is a low-priority sector: you have no linguists, the aid agencies have no money for projects in your area, you have a low priority for funding. You can still get things done, but you need to focus on self-reliance, keep things small and sustainable, and ruthlessly prioritize effort. Local community leaders are your allies in this: they know what matters to them more than you do. Be honest with them, discuss possible projects and options with community leaders, get them to choose what their priority is. Often they will find the translators, building supplies or expertise that you need, and will only expect your support and protection in making their projects work. And the process of negotiation and consultation will help mobilize their support, and strengthen their social cohesion. If you set your sights on what is achievable, the situation can still work.

What if the theater situation shifts under your feet? It is your worst nightmare: everything has gone well in your sector, but the whole theater situation has changed and invalidates your efforts. Think of the first battle of Fallujah, the al-Askariya shrine bombing, or the Sadr uprising. What do you do? Here is where having a flexible, adaptive game plan comes in. Just as the insurgents drop down to a lower posture when things go wrong, now is the time to drop back a stage, consolidate, regain your balance and prepare to expand again when the situation allows. But see article 28: if you cede the initiative, you must regain it as soon as the situation allows, or you will eventually lose.

Conclusion
This, then, is the tribal wisdom, the folklore which those who went before you have learned. Like any folklore it needs interpretation, and contains seemingly contradictory advice. Over time, as you apply unremitting intellectual effort to study your sector, you will learn to apply these ideas in your own way, and will add to this store of wisdom from your own observations and experience. So only one article remains; and if you remember nothing else, remember this:

28. Whatever else you do, keep the initiative. In counterinsurgency, the initiative is everything. If the enemy is reacting to you, you control the environment. Provided you mobilize the population, you will win. If you are reacting to the enemy œ even if you are killing or capturing him in large numbers œ then he is controlling the environment and you will eventually lose. In counterinsurgency, the enemy initiates most attacks, targets you unexpectedly and withdraws too fast for you to react. Do not be drawn into purely reactive operations: focus on the population, build your own solution, further your game plan and fight the enemy only when he gets in the way. This gains and keeps the initiative.

Washington, D.C., 29 March, 2006
Written from fieldnotes compiled in Baghdad, Tajji and Kuwait City, 2006

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Although any errors or omissions in this paper are mine alone, many people contributed directly or indirectly to it. They included Caleb Carr, Eliot Cohen, Audrey Cronin, Hank Crumpton, Janine Davidson, Jeff Davis, T.X. Hammes, John Hillen, Frank Hoffman, Scott Kofmehl, Christopher Langton, Tom Mahnken, Tim Mulholland, John Nagl, Tom Ricks and Mike Vlahos. Rob Greenway, Bruce Hoffman, Olivier Roy and Marc Sageman influenced my thinking over several months. A current serving officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, and two other members of the intelligence community, also made major contributions but cannot be named. Finally, the many company commanders, platoon leaders and others I worked with in Iraq and elsewhere inspired this effort. You carry the burden of counterinsurgency today, and into the future.

THE AUTHOR
Dr. David Kilcullen served 21 years in the Australian Army, commanded an infantry company on counterinsurgency operations in East Timor, taught tactics on the Platoon Commanders‘ Battle Course at the British School of Infantry, served on peace operations in Cyprus and Bougainville, was a military advisor to Indonesian Special Forces, and trained and led Timorese irregulars. He has worked in several Middle East countries with irregular and paramilitary police and military units, and was special adviser for Irregular Warfare to the 2005 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review. He is currently seconded to the U.S. State Department as Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and remains a Reserve Lieutenant Colonel in the Australian Army. His doctoral dissertation is a study of Indonesian insurgent and terrorist groups and counterinsurgency methods.

Jamia Nagar encounter: Alarm bells for the nation and the community

Jamia Nagar encounter: Alarm bells for the nation and the community
By Navaid Hamid
http://khabrein. info/index. php?option= com_content&task=view&id=17063&Itemid=88

Much has been said and written, in last few days, about the unearthing of the network of the terrorists killed and captured in and aftermath of the encounter at L-18, Batla House, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi. In coming days and weeks, the nation would hear and read new details of brief from security agencies, of the plot to destabilise the nation and that of new arrests in the conspiracy to terrorise the country.

Nearly all captured and killed belong to the lower middle strata of the Muslim community who have a highly brilliant educational profile and seem to be living a normal life with high dreams like any other young Indians would have.
The operation has come as a shock for the nation and the Muslim community. Till the black Friday of 9/19, the day on which the net work of the 'terrorists' was unearthed, the Indian Muslims have got words of praise even from the adversaries of Islam and Muslims, from Evangelist President Bush of America to Hindutva mascot Advani in India, for keeping themselves aloof from the groups of the militants confronting the aggressions in Iraq, American led operations in Afghanistan and armed struggle in J&K by separatists in India.

As news spread like a wild fire of the operation at Jamia Nagar, people across the nation watched TV sets in disbelief and confusion. By evening nation got brief of claims, from the security agencies, about the combing operation and unearthing of the 'terrorists' group in the capital, responsible for the bomb attacks in Delhi and other parts of the country. From the claims of the security agencies and the live electronic media trial, nation got first hand information of the indigenous Muslim terrorist network.

While the combing was still in process, the residents of the locality, civil rights groups and the Muslim organisations started raising serious reservations about the operations because of the history of the fake encounters along with the role of security agencies to demonise the Muslim community and the haste of the electronic media to sensationalise the news to raise their viewer ship rate, in past.

Incidentally the confusion, disbelief and shock remain even after so many days of the encounter. A substantial segment of Indian society, even after 60 years of democratic journey of the nation, thinks that it is obligatory for Muslims to believe with blind eyes what ever the security agencies wishes to brief and if they dares to do analysis of the events and reports, the dangers of bracketing them with anti national activities looms large over their heads.
In the Jamia shoot out, with the death of a brilliant Police officer, an encounter specialist and leader of the combing operation who died due to excess bleeding and heart attack after gun injuries in the operation, the security agencies version got weight age and wide acceptability. But still more steps and transparency are needed to convenience the nation.

The shoot out has deeply divided the society and urgent steps are required to control the damage.

The incident has nearly polarised all sections of Muslim society not only in the area around the Jamia and other Muslim concentrated localities in Delhi but also in the targeted villages and lanes around and in Azamgarh in U.P.

The Nation's official electronic channel and Radio felt it in national interest to give wide publicity to the news of transaction of 30 million rupees in one of the account of the suspect of the Delhi Bomb blast and combing operation of Jamia but transaction of few thousands was discovered after cross check from the Bank in Azamgarh. Such conflicting versions strengthen the suspicion of the civil society and the Muslim community about encounters.

There should be no problem for initiating a judicial enquiry of the Jamia encounter if the slate of the security agencies is clean and they have ample evidences against the arrested and killed suspects.

It was nothing but to demonise the entire Muslim community when the Delhi Police paraded the arrested youths with heads covered with Arabian scarf with a desire to substantiate the theory of Islamic terrorists which is un acceptable to every single Muslim in the country. The over zealots in the security agencies fails to understands that such acts are counter productive and harmful even in fight against terrorism.

The sense of 'perceived injustice' and demonisation acts is strengthening the anger and frustration which would be counter productive in the fight against terror and violence.
Now when the un believable has happened and confronting versions are coming with every passing hour, the nation and the community should seriously ponder over the fall out of the incident. If we sincerely desire that the Indian Muslims must accept the version of the security agencies about the Jamia operation, it is in the national interest to go in depth about the reasons behind the emergence of educated young Muslims involvement in acts of violence and terrorism.

We have seen how the Islamic madarsas have been targeted in past about their role in propagation of Jihad and anti national activities. The Muslim community has expected that NDA's Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Lal Krishan Advani would keep his promise and bring a white paper on the anti national activities of the madarsas and their role in propagation of Jihad but his government lost power with out any progress on the front.

Now when the biggest Islamic institution in India, Darul Uloom Deoband has categorically denounced the acts of terrorism, issued a "Fatwa" against misuse of Islam and had term the acts of violence against tenets of Islam and as we find not a single name from the Islamic Madarsas in India, involved in any kind of violent or terrorist activity in any part of the country, new phenomenon has emerged in recent past.

Wherever there have been arrests of Muslim youths for any kind of violent activity in recent past, majority of the arrested youths have highly modern educational profile with brilliant academic career. These youths have not even seen the gates of Islamic madarsa's in their life.

As per the version of the security agencies the arrested youths in different incidents in past, from Ahmedabad to Hyderabad and from Delhi to Mumbai and Karnataka, have claimed to be part of the terror network with one commonality, the commonality to take revenge of Babri Masjid demolition in 1992 and the Gujarat pogrom of 2002 in which more than 2000 innocent Muslim youths, women children were brutally killed and property worth billions were vandalsied and torched.

If we accepts the theory of the security agencies in black and white, every nationalist have a right to know about the measures taken to address the grievances.

We have silently witnessed that nothing seriously was done to give justice to the victims of Mumbai riots of 1992 and the Modiete pogrom of Gujarat. Who can deny that few victims of Gujarat has got some kind of reprieve and justice due to the intervention of the Supreme Court only.
Finance Minister Mr. P. Chidambaran gave a courageous statement while delivering Filed Marshal Carriapa's Lecture recently by admitting that alienation of the Muslim community in the country is taking educated Muslims towards "path of violence".

There is no denying fact that the more and more educated Muslim youths are loosing hope in the democratic system of the nation as in democracy the numbers are important and these youths feel that the political leadership of the nation is doing great harm to them by turning their faces away from them as they don't have numbers. They wish an inclusive policy for them but get cold response from the polity. Unfortunately majority of the Muslim politicians are shy to advocate their case and are busy in safeguarding their interests for their own survival.

It is high time that instead of jerk reactions, the Muslim leadership and community's organisations should sit together to plan joint strategies to fight the onslaught and do urgent home work to consul the agitated young minds of the community before it's too late. Leadership have to convey a strong message in the community that the path of violence would lead us to nowhere and would do more harm to us beside strengthing the hands of community's adversaries.

It is in the national interest that the political leadership of the nation must find consensus for having an inclusive policy for all including Muslims. To convince the Muslim community and the civil society about the fair and impartial role of the security agencies, some kind of mechanism needs to be developed and the easiest ways seems to be constitution of Judicial Commission to probe every terrorist activity in the country. This is necessary because nation has witnessed that majority of the arrested Muslim youths, in past, have got reprieve from courts during the trials as Anti-Terrorism Squad fails to convince the courts about its charges against the arrested youths.

It is a sad story that more and more Bar Councils in the country are passing resolutions asking its members not to take cases of the arrested Muslim suspects. Hyderabad has witnessed violent assault on Muslim Advocates when they decided to defend the arrested Muslim youths. Who can deny that a good majority from more than 180 Muslim youths arrested for terrorist activities were acquitted in the trial court in Andhra Pradesh and just two suspects are facing charges in Hyderabad blasts.

In Delhi, an advocate has withdrawn himself from the defense Counsel of the arrested suspect. It would be great injustice if nation expects that Muslims must also crucify the arrested suspects with out fair trials.

Knives are out against the Vice Chancellor, Prof. Mushir ul Hasan of Jamia Millia Islamia, the institution which was at the forefront of the freedom struggle and was established to strengthen the composite fabric and plural structure of Indian society, for daring to take a courageous step to provide legal aid to two of its students who are suspects in the Delhi Blasts. The purpose seems to not to defend them but to give them a chance to prove their innocence in court. For BJP it is an anti national act.
Leave alone the perpetrators of the mass crimes against hapless Muslims in Mumbai riots and the Gujarat pogrom of 2002, even the killers of Father of the nation, Mahatma Gandhi, Former Prime Ministers Indra Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi have a right to get them defended but the arrested Muslim suspects deserves to be hanged without fair trial.

In an ideal state it is paramount duty of the establishment to convince every group and race, by actions, about the impartiality of the state apparatus.

The nation has witnessed the casual behavior of state apparatus when it comes to take even notice of the activities of Bajrang Dal and VHP. Bombs were not only recovered from activists of Bajrang Dal from the State of Maharashtra, U.P. and Orissa, but its activists were killed while developing bombs in Kanpur in State of Uttar Pradesh. Camps of arms training were organized for its cadres but we see no action from the security agencies against the militant Hindutva outfit.

In last two months, Bajrang Dal and VHP activists have killed and attacked Christians, vendalised and torched Churches from Uttarakhand to Orissa and Karnataka but hapless nation waits for more attacks from them on minorities.

The acts of demonising the Muslim community would do more harm instead of solving problems and further alienate Muslims besides posing great dangers for the nation. The politicalisation of terrorism and the victimization of the Muslim community would undoubtly further breed real terrorists in the Muslim community. Nation should rise above petty politics and politicalisation of terrorism must stop at once.

(Navaid Hamid is Secretary, South Asian Council for Minorities and can be reached at navaidhamid@ gmail.com This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it )
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Jamia residents foil “encounter” attempt

http://www.twocircles.net/2008oct16/jamia_residents_foiled_encounter_attempt.html
INDIA: Jamia residents foil “encounter” attempt
SEE VIDEO INTERVIEW: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tZfOkRwo3ho

By Mumtaz Alam Falahi,

TwoCircles.net

New Delhi: The residents of Jamia Nagar today foiled a kidnapping/encounter attempt by some policemen in plainclothes in Shaheen Bagh area under the Jamia Nagar Police Station in Delhi.

It was around 8 in the night when a black Hyundai car with tinted glasses but with no number plates entered Shaheen Bagh. Five persons, maybe ATS sleuths in plainclothes, came out and tried to drag a youth named Amir into the car. He resisted and asked them why they were dragging him. They said they will tell him soon.

As the Jamia Nagar encounter and subsequent indiscriminate picking of locals were fresh in people’s mind, locals began gathering. The plainclothes people threatened them but as mob got thicker, some of them slipped away. The locals, however, were able to catch one who later turned out to be an ASI of Noida Police. The public brought both the policeman and Amir to Jamia Nagar police station.

Hundreds of people gathered around the police station and demanded action against the 'kidnapppers'. They alleged that their plan was to encounter the person and later declare him a terrorist.

People say Amir was with his friend Irfan on a motorcycle. Amir from Zafarabad area in Delhi had come here to meet someone. They alleged that his friend Irfan was police informer because those came in car tried to drag into the car only Amir, not Irfan. Irfan also fled the scene.

The car had no number plate but a number plate was found in the car which had DL1T W 1590 written on it. The plate looked new and unused. The mob also was able to snatch some documents from the Noida policemen. They include PANCARDS, mobile, SIM. Among other things in the car two ID with different picture but same name belonging to an IT company was found in the car. The angry residents damaged the car and broke window panes. The local police reached the spot and asked the residents to hand over Amir and the policemen but the people demanded that they will do it before higher authorities.

Soon ACP (Sarita Vihar) Gurcharan Das reached there and persuaded the locals to handover the men. After much effort the police could bring them and the car to the Jamia Nagar Police Station. But hundreds of locals followed the police and reached the station.

People remained outside the station until 1 am when the police announced that the FIR from Amir has been registered. This all proceeding was done in the presence of Aziz Burney, Editor of Sahara Urdu daily, Md Rahman, Delhi High Court advocate and some local leaders.

Talking to mediapersons around 1 am, DCP Ajay Choudhry said those who came in the car were Noida Police personnel. The Delhi Police will investigate the matter. He said he had contacted Noida SSP and he assured he is looking into the case and action will be taken against the guilty officials.

Mainstream Media Questions Delhi Encounter Killings

Mainstream Media Questions Delhi Encounter Killings
By L. George
25 September, 2008
Countercurrents. org
http://www.counterc urrents.org/ george250908. htm

Finally it has happened: the main stream media in India has for the first time come out with something other than the 'official version' of the encounter killings that have taken place in the country.
NDTV Report
An NDTV report with the headline 'Cover-up charges cling to terror probe' has said that Delhi's latest terror spectre throws up contrasting images. A police officer -- one of the finest -- shot 3 times. And, young, educated, fun-loving men who, the police say, are deadly terrorists.
The police are convinced that Atif and his young group, most of them in their 20s with the youngest just 17, is responsible for all the major blasts in India this year and the death of nearly 150 people.
But now, a group of lawyers and human rights activists are raising questions. They ask who are the two missing men, who escaped from the flat in Batla house on the day of encounter. And how could they possibly escape when the only way out was a narrow staircase and there were several policemen in the area.
The other point is that the profiles of these young men seem to indicate terror was the farthest thing in their minds. They were regular college-going students.
One of those arrested, Zeeshan, was taking giving his exams on the day of the encounter. He came on TV to surrender. Why didn't he run away?, asks NDTV. The police say they have evidence that he planted the bomb at Delhi's Barakhamba Road.
Another alleged Indian Mujahideen (IM) operative Saqib was also arrested. A gold medalist in economics honours from Jamia Millia University, he was a regular on Orkut. He maintained a profile like most users do and had a wide circle of friends.
Cops claim the 23-year-old was involved in both Ahmedabad and Delhi blasts. Saqib's family has countered the police claims and furnished documents to show that Saquib appeared for six exams from the 23rd of July to the 28th July -- the time that the police claim he was planning the blasts.
Shakib's brother says: "He was the topper in his class for the last two years."
The house where the men were staying and its caretaker are also under the scanner. The caretaker, who has worked in the PWD for several years, insists that he gave the details of the men staying at his home to the police almost a month before the blasts.
However, the police have now arrested him for forging these documents. His son has also been arrested for alleged nexus with the terrorists.
There are several such questions to which there are still no easy answers. And the police know they will have to find hard evidence to back each of their claims. However, they say the death of Inspector Sharma proves there was no fake encounter.
Mail Today
The Mali Today has also come out with a version raising many questions about the encounter:
It says two eyewitnesses of the September 19 cell action at Jamia Nagar have presented a version of the event that is at complete variance with what has been offered by Delhi Police.
Their reconstruction of the event, which indicates a scuffle had probably taken place before the shots were fired, many also explain why Jamia Nagar residents are not buying the police theory that the team has either eliminated or arrested the men allegedly behind the bomb blasts in Delhi, Ahmedabad and Jaipur.
This version given to MAIL TODAY on the condition of anonymity, squares up with the hitherto unreported autopsy report on Sharma and the nature of wounds on the bodies of the two young men killed by the Special Cell of the Delhi Police. The autopsy report on Sharma, which is with the Headlines Today, says he was shot at from extremely close range, no more than a few centimeters from him. he was hit by three bullets. All of them entered through the back and followed a top-to-down trajectory.
The body of one of the 'terrorists' bears injury marks, sharp wounds and multiple internal injuries in the stomach. Doctors say such injuries are usually attributed to a scuffle, a violent physical assault. Someone may even have stamped on him. His flatmate Mohammed Sajid also dead, was apparently shot in the head. Could his death too have occurred during the scuffle?
Further, could Inspector Sharma have been injured during the fisticuffs that ensued between the alleged Delhi bombers and the policemen who were raiding supposed terrorist hideouts? Is it possible that he suffered the injuries when a bullet went off accidentally during the scuffle?
There is no way to find out the kind of bullet injury that Sharma suffered. No bullets were found on his body during his autopsy. The medical bulletin of Holy family Hospital, where he was taken first, said no "foreign bodies were found in his chest and abdomen.
Mail Today took exhaustive eyewitness accounts of the police action on September 19. Eyewitnesses, who live in the immediate vicinity of L-18, Batla House - the alleged IM hideout - said the Special Cell team that raided the scene of action brought two young men to the ground floor from their fourth-floor flat. they had a verbal altercation with the two men and killed them after some of them realised Sharma had been shot.
Jamia Nagar residents had been seeing heightened activity by the policemen in civilian clothes for about a week before the police action. Yet, they were taken aback when a group of policemen in civvies surrounded L-18, Batla House, on September 19, for they had not seen any suspicious activity in their building. It is hard to keep secrets in the rabbit warren of apartment blocks in Jamia Nagar.
A member of the Special Cell first went up to the fourth-floor flat occupied by Atif and Sajid, pretending to be a cellphone salesman. the young men inside the flat did not receive the undercover policeman cordially. They entered into an argument with sub-inspector Ddharmender, who was pretending to be the salesman.
All this took place in front of the neighbours who had come out onto the balconies of their flats on hearing the commotion. Reacting immediately when the arguments started, the policemen waiting downstairs rushed up.
None of them had their guns out. Clearly, they were not expecting any armed resistance. One of the men, whom the eyewitnesses were able to identify after seeing his images on television, Sharma.
Speaking from behind a grill that covers the fourth-floor staircase at L-18, Sharma yelled at all the neighbours who had come out of their houses to go indoors because they could get hurt in the "firing". Residents of the area followed his instructions. But the eyewitnesses, being quoted by the Mail Today, watched the goings-on from behind their toilet windows.
They saw only two men in the flat. that leaves the man who was arrested from the spot, Mohammed Saif, and the two men who reportedly escaped during the police action unaccounted for.
They saw Sharma's men drag Atif and Sajid to the ground floor landing. The two men, who were subsequently killed, appeared to be in panic and unarmed at the time. No one could see what happened thereafter as the partly covered ground floor landing was not in their line of vision.
The eyewitness could hear the policemen hurling abuses at the two youngmen. This was followed by gunshots. Then someone shouted, "Sahab ko goli lag gayi (the boss has been shot)." The young men could not be hard in this commotion. After sometime, the eyewitnesses hear more gunshots. The policemen came into the view of our eyewitnesses. They were dragging the bodies of two men upstairs.
Around the same time, they saw sub-inspector Dharmender, and another policeman leading Sharma out of the building. The eyewitness couldn't figure out the extent of Sharma's injury from what they saw.
The bodies of two youngmen, meanwhile, were dragged up to their flat by the policemen. Then they wrapped the bodies with cloth.
According to the eyewitnesses, after the two bodies were taken away and piled into a police van, a group of policemen materialised out of the blue with three young men they had rounded up, seemingly from within the L-18 flats. They were unable to make out where the men came from. One of them, it appears now, was Mohammed Saif. He is now in the police custody.
The reconstruction by the eyewitnesses posed some questions. Why did two young men, and their alleged accomplices, not flee the scene or clean up their laptops even after everyone in the neighbourhood was aware of the heightened police presence in the area?
Why did the policemen not have their guns out when they rushed up to the flat after the argument broke out between sub-inspector Dharmender and the two men?
Was Sharma shot at by the alleged terrorists or was he a victim of collateral damage because he happened to be in the range of a ricocheting bullet?

'Multiple masterminds'

We are also forced to take a new look at the announcements made by the Police.

After killing the two youths Atif and Sajjid in Delhi, the special police cell chief Karnal Singh claimed that they were the masterminds behind the bombings of Uttar Pradesh courts (23 November, 2007), Jaipur bombings (13 May, 2008), Ahmedabad bombings (26 July, 2008), and Delhi bombings (13 September, 2008).
He also claimed that they were behind the Varanassi bombings of 2006 and Gorakhpur bombings of 2007. If what the Delhi police claim is true, what about the alleged mastermind that the Gujarat police arrested in connection with Ahmedabad bombings, Abu Basher?
Gujarat Police claimed that he was the master mind of all these bombings.
On September 24th, Mumbai Police have also arrested new 'masterminds' of all these blasts. Rajastan Police had arrested a cyber cafe owner, Shahbas Hussain. They also claim that he was the mastermind of the Jaipur blasts. Whom should we believe?

In the light of these revelations and views people in India and around the world may adopt a new stand: not to swallow the official versions as such.
------------ --------- ------- ------------ --------- --

Report on The Jamia ’Encounter’ by Jan Hastakshep, Campaign against Fascist Designs and PUDR

[The below content is available at: http://www.sacw.net/article41.html]

o o o

Report on The Jamia ’Encounter’

by Jan Hastakshep, Campaign against Fascist Designs and PUDR

26 September 2008

Released to the Press on 26 September, 2008 at a Press Conference in
New Delhi

A fact finding team constituted by Janhastakshep, Campaign against
Fascist Designs and People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) went
to look into the issues being raised in context to alleged an
encounter at Batla House, Jamia Nagar on September 19, 2008. Members
of the team were, Dr. N.K. Bhattacharya retd. Principal of a Delhi
University College, Shahana Bhattacharya of Delhi University, Dr. Ish
Misra, Delhi University, Prashant Bhusan, Advocate Supreme Court, Mr.
N. D. Pancholi, Advocate, Delhi High Court, and Ms. Shreerekha, a
teacher in Jamia Milia Islamia. The team was accompanied by Prof. Mir
Imtiaz of Jamia Milia Islamia.

Some of the findings of the Fact finding exercise undertaken on
September 21, 2008

1. L-18 Batla house, the scene of the two ‘encounter’ killings of
Atif and Sajid, is a four storied building with two flats on each
floor and a single stairwell. There is only one entrance to the
building. All the other spaces are grilled and cannot be used to get
out of the building. The building is abutted on the left and right by
two buildings which are only about two floors high. There is a narrow
lane to the front and an even narrower lane at the back.

2. Documentary evidence proves that Atif had submitted his correct
details to the police in a tenant verification form duly received by
the police on August 21, 2008. The form is a printed form which has
been countersigned and bears the seal of the Jamia Nagar police
station. The form also has his correct mobile phone number.

3. The shooting seems to have begun at around 11 AM, Eyewitnesses
state that the regular police arrived about fifteen minutes
thereafter, and the media arrived five to ten minutes after the
police arriving, by which time the area had already been cordoned off.

4. The police did not show anyone the faces of the victims of the
‘encounter’ killings. Neither have they allowed the media access to
the scene of the crime which has been sealed. By the time the media
arrived, Mohan Chand Sharma had apparently already been carried down
four floors of stairs with wounds, which eventually proved fatal.
There seems to be a photograph of a conscious M.C.Sharma being
carried out of the building by two of his aides showing some
bleeding. People who saw him a few meters ahead, however, state that
he was bleeding profusely when he was being carried past the
Khaliullah Masjid in the vicinity.

5. Zeeshan who also shared the flat was writing the IIPM entrance
test at the time of the alleged encounter and was arrested later in
the night of 19 September from the Head Lines today studios at
Jhandelwalan, soon after he had given an interview at the television
studio which was partially aired. As he was coming out of the
television channel’s office he was arrested by the police. He too is
being called a terrorist.

Questions Regarding the Police version

1. How many masterminds are there? A succession of organizations such
as the HUJI, SIMI and the IM have already been named by different
State police as the organizations responsible for the blasts that
have taken place in Jaipur, Ahmedabad and Delhi and the bomb scare in
Surat. Atif suddenly becomes the new mastermind of all the blasts
after a succession of other masterminds such as Abu Bashir, Tauqeer,
etc. His name was never mentioned earlier, not even a few days ago
when the sketches of the Delhi Bombers were released.

2. When did the police get to know that they were terrorists? If they
knew before they entered, why did they not seal the exit to the
building and ask the alleged terrorists to surrender without going in?

3. If the Special Cell knew that they were terrorists why was
M.C.Sharma not wearing a bullet proof vest if the Special Cell was
going to arrest/apprehend dreaded terrorists?

4. If the Special cell did not know that they were terrorists before
they entered, how did they claim soon thereafter that these were the
terrorists and mastermind behind the blasts without even the
opportunity of an interrogation of the person arrested and a thorough
investigation of the evidence from the scene of the alleged encounter?

5. Could two persons have escaped, considering there are no escape
routes save one which was the entrance from which the STF entered
heavily armed?

6. If they were truly the terrorists behind the bombings they would
surely not have given their correct personal details in a tenant
verification form to the police on the 21st of August, 2008, just
after the Ahmedabad Blasts and before the Delhi Blasts.

7. The Special Cell now claims that the verification form is forged,
despite the fact that it is countersigned and bears the seal of the
Jamia Nagar Police Station. However these documents were handed over
to the media by the caretaker of the apartment within two hours of
the alleged encounters and hence he did not have enough time to have
carried out such a forgery.

8. As per news reports the police has so far not carried out a Test
Identification Parade by eyewitnesses who claim to have seen those
responsible for the Delhi bomb blasts? Was a TIP done before the
burial of the two boys who were shot dead? Has the police tried to
match the sketches of the accused made at the time with those being
arrested? What are the results of such efforts if they have been made?

9. In view of the continuing speculation and controversies
surrounding the ‘encounter’ and a version of the postmortem reports
being discussed by the press, why have the post-mortem reports of the
two youths and the policeman who were killed in the house not been
made available to their families and to the public?

10. Has an FIR been lodged or investigation launched into the
incident of the ‘encounter’ itself? *

*This is what the law requires. NHRC guidelines on encounter killings
clearly state “That when information is received that death was
caused in an encounter as a result of firing by the police, prima
facie the ingredients of culpable homicide under section 299 of the
IPC are satisfied. That is sufficient to suspect that an offence of
culpable homicide has been committed.”

11. Since, according to the press statement issued by Holy Family
Hospital on September 19, 2008, X rays of the chest and abdomen of
M.C.Sharma had “not revealed any foreign bodies”, what has happened
to the bullets fired on him? have they been collected from the scene
and sent for forensic analysis?

Preliminary Conclusions

1. The version of the police that they had learnt that these youths
were behind the Delhi Blasts when they went in to arrest them is
clearly false since, in that case, Inspector Sharma, and his team who
were experienced policemen from the Special Cell and had in fact been
involved in several lethal encounters in the past would not have
entered the premises at all and certainly not without bullet proof
vests.

2. The police gave the version of these youths being the terrorists
behind the Delhi, Ahmedabad and Jaipur blasts and of Atif being the
mastermind to the media soon after the alleged encounter. Till this
point the police had not had the time to interrogate Saif, who had
been arrested, or to thoroughly investigate the laptops recovered
from the scene of the incident etc. and hence had no actionable
information on the basis of which to make such claims. Therefore the
police version that they were the terrorists behind the blasts with
Atif as the mastermind clearly seems to be a story concocted by the
Special Cell before they went to pick up these people.

3. The story of 2 people escaping from the building is an utter lie.

4. The subsequent picking up of Zia ur Rahman, the caretaker’s son,
and of Shakeel and others on the pretext that they were also involved
in this conspiracy is highly dubious and smacks of vindictiveness
against individuals who came out with statements and evidence that
contradicted the police version.

5. The claim of the police that the tenant verification form, handed
over to the media by the caretaker, Rahman, only a couple of hours
after the incident, is forged, is not at all credible. There appears
no reason for Rahman to have forged such a form and kept it with him
in advance, and there was certainly no time for him to have forged
the papers and handed them to the media soon after the incident.

6. Saquib Nisar, who the police claim provided logistical support for
the serial blasts in Ahmedabad and the bomb scare in Surat, was
taking an MBA examination from July 23 to July 28, 2008. Copies of
his admit card and exam sheets signed by the examiners are available.

7. None of the accused who are alive and arrested have legal
representation or counsel. Moreover the police have been releasing
information supposedly procured from them during interrogation to the
media. This further adversely affects their chances of justice.

Recommendations

1. It is imperative that an independent, time bound comprehensive
probe has to be carried out by a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court
of India into this incident and the claims of the police, to answer
these questions. In any case, the NHRC guidelines on encounter
killings require such an investigation.

2. The continuing random arrests and harassment of residents of Jamia
Nagar and students of Jamia University since the time of the Delhi
blasts and particularly after the alleged encounter must stop
immediately.

3. The competition among various police agencies to claim credit for
arresting dreaded terrorists and masterminds is resulting in the
targeting of innocent Muslim youth. This must stop immediately. It
appears that after making SIMI the scapegoat, the police has now
shifted focus to Azamgarh which is being dubbed the nursery of
terrorism. This targeting and victimisation of young Muslim boys from
Azamgarh or those who may have been members of SIMI in the past, as
terrorists involved in the blasts, has led to an enormous sense of
insecurity, fear and resentment in the Muslim community of the
country in general and young Muslim boys from Azamgarh or those who
may have been members of SIMI, in particular.

4. It is very unfortunate and disquieting that significant sections
of the mainstream media, particularly the electronic media, has been
uncritically amplifying the successive absurd stories and concoctions
of the police, built only on supposed confessions made before the
Police. This has not only defamed a large number of apparently
innocent people but is also encouraging rapid communalisation and
polarisation of people in the country.

SIGNED

Dr. NK Bhattacharya

JAN HASTAKSHEP and PUDR

Upper castes dominate media: Survey

http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/jun/05quota1.htm?q=tp

Upper castes dominate media: Survey

June 05, 2006 16:39 IST

The news about the national media is hardly flattering if the findings of a survey are to be believed.

The national media, which front-paged the reservation controversy in all its facets, is now itself being sucked into that quagmire with the first-of-its-kind survey revealing that top echelons of media establishments are dominated by ''Hindu upper caste men.''

Jointly conducted by Yogendra Yadav, senior fellow at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Anil Chamaria, a freelance journalist, and Jitendra Kumar from the Media Study Group, the controversial survey says India's 'national media' lacks social diversity and does not reflect the country's social profile.

''Hindu upper caste men dominate the media. They are about eight per cent of India's population but among the key decision-makers of the national media, their share is as high as 71 per cent,'' it points out.

The survey, which tracked the social profile of 315 senior journalists in 37 English and Hindi dailies and TV channels, also revealed gender bias in the media establishments. It was carried out by volunteers of Media Study Group between May 30 and June 3.

''Only 17 per cent of the key decision-makers are women though their representation is somewhat better (32 per cent) in the English electronic media,'' it says.

Women account for 16 per cent of top editorial posts in the English print media and 14 per cent and 11 per cent in the Hindi print media and electronic media, respectively.

The survey also takes a swipe at media's caste profile, describing it as 'unrepresentative'.

''Twice born Hindus ('dwijas' comprising Brahmins, Kayasthas, Rajputs, Vaishyas and Khatris) account for about 16 per cent of India's population, but they are about 86 per cent among the key media decision-makers. Brahmins (including Bhumihars and Tyagis) alone constitute 49 per cent of the key media personnel,'' he survey adds.

If 'non-dwija' forward castes like Marathas, Patels, Jats and Reddys are also added to this list, the total share of the upper castes would be pegged at a staggering 88 per cent.

Further, Dalits and Adivasis, points out the survey, are conspicuous by their absence among the decision-makers. Not even one of the 315 key decision-makers belongs to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes.

''The proportion of the OBCs is abysmally low among the key decision-makers in the national media They are only four per cent compared to their population of around 43 per cent in the country,'' it added.

The representation of Muslims is also grossly under-represented in the national media, the survey notes. Muslims, who comprise 13.4 per cent of the country's population, have a share of only four per cent in top media posts.

Muslims, however, fare better in the Hindi electronic media, accounting for around six per cent of major decision-makers. In the national capital itself, there were no Muslims at the seniormost levels.

The facts are more palatable with regard to the Christians, who are proportionately represented in the media, mainly in the English media. Their share is about four per cent compared to their population of 2.3 per cent.

The survey also makes a reference to ''doubly disatvantaged'' social groups such as women belonging to OBCs or backward caste Muslims and Christians.

''Social groups that suffer double disadvantage' are nearly absent among the key decsion-makers. There are no women among the few OBC decision makers and negligible backwards among the Muslims and Christians,'' the survey notes.

The findings were based on a survey of designation, age, caste, religion, mother tongue, gender and domicile of a maximum of 10 top decision-makers from 37 media establishments.

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